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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3)(j) (2009). On February 17, 2010, this Court transferred this appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals subject to the right of the parties to request that the Court retain the 
matter. This Court subsequently vacated its February 17th order of transfer and elected to 
retain jurisdiction over this appeal by Order dated March 18, 2010. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellant, Jeffrey Warne ("Jeff), individually and as Trustee of the Ira B. Warne 
Family Protection Trust, presents the following issues in this appeal: 
1. Did the district court err in granting Plaintiff Thomas Warne's ("Tom") 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in ruling that Ira Warne's ("Ira") partial 
revocation of his living trust was invalid based upon the language in Banks v. Means, 
2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190, when, unlike the settlor in Banks, who, within just one month 
prior to her death, executed only three replacement pages that conflicted with the stated 
and unmodified purpose of her trust, Ira executed a Partial Revocation that clearly 
evidenced his intent to disinherit Tom over four years prior to his death and also 
subsequently wrote a letter confirming his reasons for disinheriting Tom, which included 
the fact that Ira believed Tom had made more than one attempt to steal money from him? 
(Issue Preserved: R.465-68; 560:16-17.) 
Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions 
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
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party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, \ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
2. Did the district court err in failing to apply Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605? 
a. Did the district court err in granting Tom summary judgment and 
ruling that Ira's Partial Revocation of his living trust is invalid based upon Banks 
v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190, when Banks has been superseded by the 
adoption of Section 75-7-605 of the Utah Uniform Trust Code? (Issue preserved: 
R.560:26; 530-33.) 
Standard of Review: "Review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment 
includes a determination of whether the trial court correctly applied governing 
law, affording no deference to the trial court's determination or conclusions of 
law." Burton v. Exam Center Indus. & General Medical Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, 
\ 4, 994 P.2d 1261. In conducting such a review, this Court "views the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." Orvis, 2008 UT 2 at ^ 6 (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
b. Did the district court err in denying Jeffs Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment on the ground that Jeff failed to raise the issue of whether Banks v. 
Means has been superseded by Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 when Jeff argued for 
the application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 at oral argument and the district 
court declared that it had taken under advisement "the parties' written 
4829-3754-7270/WA760-005 2 
submissions, the relevant legal authority and counsel's oral argument"? (Issue 
Preserved: R.530-33.) 
Standard of Review: Generally, district courts are afforded "broad 
discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial" pursuant to Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Smith v. Fairfax Realtyf Inc., 2003 UT 41, \ 25, 82 
P.3d 1064. However, when the judge deciding the Rule 59 motion is "a stranger 
to the case," this Court gives "his decision no deference" and reviews the decision 
"under a correction of error standard." Mann v. Fredrickson, 2006 UT App 475, ^ 
6, 153P.3d768. 
3. Did the district court err in granting Tom summary judgment on Jeffs 
counterclaim in its entirety, including Jeffs request to reform the Ira B. Warne Family 
Protection Trust pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415, when Jeff presented substantial 
evidence that Ira intended to reserve for himself the power to revoke his living trust, in 
whole or in part, and that Ira executed the Partial Revocation with the express intent of 
avoiding the consequences of the Banks v. Means ruling? (Issue Preserved: R.468-70.) 
Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions 
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Orvis, 2008 UT 2 at f 6 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
4. Did the district court err in granting Tom's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and ruling that Tom was entitled to one-half of the personal property of Ira's 
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estate when Ira executed a pour-over will that transferred all of his personal property to 
the Trust? (Issue preserved: R.470-71.) 
Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions 
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Orvis, 2008 UT 2 at f 6 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Jeff attaches as addenda to this brief a copy of the following determinative statutes 
and rules: 
(A)Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415 (2009); 
(B)Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 (2009); and 
(C)UtahR. Civ.P. 59. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This appeal concerns the validity of the Partial Revocation of and Amendment to 
the Ira B. Warne Family Protection Trust (hereinafter "Partial Revocation"), executed by 
Defendant Jeffrey's ("Jeff) and Plaintiff Thomas' ("Tom") father, Ira B. Warne ("Ira"). 
Despite substantial evidence that Ira executed the Partial Revocation for the sole purpose 
of disinheriting Tom, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Tom and 
declared the Partial Revocation invalid. In so ruling, the district court relied on the 
language of Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190, which states that a complete 
revocation, rather than a mere amendment, is required to divest a beneficiary of a vested 
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interest in a trust. Id. at ^ J 12. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This appeal arises from a complaint filed by Tom on May 12, 2008, in the Third 
Judicial District Court for the State of Utah. (R.l-6.) Tom's complaint, as subsequently 
amended, sought to invalidate the Partial Revocation, which, if enforced, would have 
divested Tom of all interest in his father's trust.1 (R.47-51.) In response, Jeff, 
individually and in his capacity as trustee of the Ira B. Warne Family Protection Trust 
(the "Trust"), filed a counterclaim, requesting that the Trust be reformed pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-7-415 to reflect Ira's intentions. (R.162-172.) 
On July 15, 2009, Tom moved for summary judgment on certain of his claims and 
on Jeffs counterclaims. (R.317-30, 458-60.) Specifically, Tom requested that the 
district court declare Ira's Partial Revocation invalid and unenforceable under Banks v. 
Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190. (R.321-24.) Tom also requested that the district 
court hold that Ira's codicil, executed at the same time that Ira signed the Partial 
Revocation, did not alter the distribution provisions of Ira's will. (R.324-25.) Finally, 
Tom requested that the district court find that he and his brother, Jeff, are co-trustees and 
equal beneficiaries of their mother's trust, the Avis P. Warne Family Protection Trust. 
(R.325-26.) 
Jeff opposed the motion, arguing that the language of the Trust clearly provided 
1
 Tom amended his complaint to include the trustees of the Ira B. Warne Family 
Protection Trust and the Avis P. Warne Family Protection Trust after the district court 
granted Jeffs Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join an Indispensable Party or 
Alternatively, Motion for Joinder of Indispensable Party. (R. 143-46; 149-157.) 
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that Ira may revoke the Trust "in whole or in part." (R.465.) Because Ira's intent to 
disinherit Tom was unambiguously expressed in both the Partial Revocation and in a 
letter written four years after Ira executed the Partial Revocation, Jeff argued that the 
court should not disregard Ira's expressed intent, desires, and instructions regarding the 
distribution of his property simply because Ira's counsel did not prepare a complete 
revocation of the entire Trust. (R.465-68.) Jeff also argued that, in the event the district 
court determined that the Partial Revocation is invalid, Ira's Trust should be reformed 
pursuant to Section 75-7-415, Utah Code Ann., to properly reflect Ira's intent. (R.468-
70.) Finally, Jeff asserted that, because Ira's will was a pour-over will, the district court 
should find that all of Ira's assets were transferred to the Trust. (R. 470.) 
After the motion was briefed but before oral argument was held, Jeff engaged new 
counsel to represent him in this matter. (R.512-13.) Thereafter, oral argument was held 
on October 26, 2009, before the Honorable Robert P. Faust. (R.517.) During oral 
argument, Jeffs new counsel of record argued that the holding in Banks had been 
superseded by the Uniform Trust Code and, more specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-
605, which was adopted by the Utah Legislature approximately two years after the Utah 
Supreme Court issued the Banks decision. (R.560:25-26.) In addition to raising this 
dispositive statute before the district court, counsel for Jeff provided both the district 
court and opposing counsel with copies of the statute.. (R.560:9, 25.) Although 
"not[ing]" that Section 75-7-605 had not been addressed in the written memorandum 
opposing the motion for summary judgment, counsel for Tom did not object to the 
court's consideration of the statute and, in fact, argued that the statute did not apply to the 
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case at bar. (R.560:27, 32-33.) (A copy of relevant portions of the October 26, 2009 
Oral Argument Transcript is attached hereto as Addendum D.) 
After oral argument, the district court "took the matter under advisement to further 
consider the parties' written submissions, the relevant legal authority and counsel's oral 
argument." (R.518.) On November 18, 2009, the district court issued its Memorandum 
Decision. (R.518-22.) (A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as 
Addendum E.) The district court's decision did not address application of Section 75-7-
605 of the Utah Code and instead held that Ira's Partial Revocation of his Trust to 
disinherit Tom was invalid under Banks v. Means. Specifically, the court declared that it 
could not "override Banks by interpreting the Ira Trust language as requiring merely a 
partial revocation when the Utah Supreme Court has clearly indicated that a complete 
revocation and a return of property is required." (R.520.) 
The district court similarly refused to reform the Trust to reflect Ira's stated 
desires and instructions regarding the distribution of his property, declaring that "[t]his is 
not a case where the settlor was mistaken about the law or was unclear about how to 
accomplish his purposes. Instead, being fully aware of Banks, Ira and his counsel simply 
sought to accomplish an end run around this opinion." (Id.) Finally, the district court 
held that Ira's codicil did not alter the distribution provisions of Ira's will, and, as such, 
Tom "is entitled to one-half of the personal property included in Ira's estate." (R.521.) 
Because the district court failed to address the newer provisions of the Uniform 
Trust Act, Jeff timely moved to alter or amend the court's decision pursuant to Rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 523-25.) In his motion, Jeff again asserted that 
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the validity and effect of the Partial Revocation should be determined by reference to the 
provisions of the Uniform Trust Code, which supersedes the holding of Banks v. Means. 
(R.523-25; 530-33.) Because the Uniform Trust Code specifically provides that a settlor 
may effectively revoke or amend his trust by "substantially complying with a method 
provided in the terms of the trust," Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)(a), Jeff requested that 
the district court amend its judgment to declare that the Partial Revocation is valid and 
must be given effect. (R.530-33.) In the alternative, Jeff requested that the district court 
certify its ruling as final for purposes of appeal. (R.533.) 
After the parties fully briefed Jeffs Motion to Alter or Amend, the case was 
transferred from Judge Faust to Judge Maughan. Judge Maughan then issued his Ruling 
and Order on Rule 54(b) Certification on January 12, 2010, denying Jeffs motion. 
(R.552A-552D.) (A copy of the Ruling and Order on Rule 54(b) Certification is attached 
hereto as Addendum F.) The district court did, however, certify the decision as final. 
(R.552C.) Jeff now appeals the summary judgment and the refusal to alter or amend. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 15, 1991, Ira B. Warne, the father of Jeff and Tom Warne, executed the 
Ira B. Warne Family Protection Trust (the "Trust"). (R.332.) (A copy of the Trust is 
attached hereto as Addendum G.) The Trust was established "for the primary benefit of 
the Undersigned [Ira] during [his] lifetime, for [Ira's] surviving spouse, and for [Ira's] 
family thereafter," which was defined as Ira's wife, Avis P. Warne, and his two children, 
Tom and Jeff Warne. (Id.) The Trust provided that, after the deaths of Ira and his wife, 
Avis, the Trust corpus should be divided equally among Tom and Jeff. (R.337.) The 
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Trust also designated Tom and Jeff as successor co-trustees, with "complete power and 
discretion" to manage and administer the Trust. (R.339, 344.) 
Despite his designations of beneficiaries and successor trustees, Ira specifically 
reserved for himself the power to amend any provision of the Trust. Specifically, Ira 
included a provision in the Trust which provided that, as long as Ira is alive, he "reserves 
the right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in part, including the 
principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from such principal. Such 
revocation or amendment of th[e] Trust may be in whole or in part by written 
instrument." (R.333, f 3.1 (emphasis added).) Ira's wife, Avis, executed a similar trust 
on the same date with similar provisions. (R104-14.) Along with their trusts, the Warnes 
also executed "pour-over" wills on July 15, 1991.2 (R.353-58.) 
Over eleven years after Ira executed the Trust, the Utah Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190. In that opinion, the Court 
interpreted a trust executed by Ms. Banks that contained a provision identical to that 
found in paragraph 3.2 of Ira's Trust. That provision provided that "[t]he interests of the 
beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue 
until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death." Id. at f 12. The Court held 
that such language required that Ms. Banks' trust be completely revoked rather than 
merely amended in order to divest the trust's beneficiaries of their vested interests in the 
trust. Id. at f 16. Indeed, the Court declared as follows: 
Avis Warne died on April 13, 1998, leaving Jeff and Tom as the remaining contingent 
beneficiaries of the Ira Trust. 
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By the plain language of the trust, the beneficiaries have vested interests 
that continue until the interests are revoked or terminated. Here, Ms. Banks 
reserved the power to revoke, modify, or amend the trust in whole or in part 
in section 3.1, but limited that power in section 3.2 with regard to the 
beneficiaries. Thus, a complete revocation was required to divest the 
beneficiaries of their vested interests. 
A/, at If 12. 
Several years after Ira executed the Trust, the relationship of Ira and Tom 
deteriorated to such an extent that Ira sought to amend his estate planning documents to 
completely disinherit Tom. (R.360-66, 463-64.) Specifically, Ira executed a "Partial 
Revocation of and Amendment to the Ira B. Warne Family Protection Trust" (hereinafter 
"Partial Revocation") and a "Codicil to the Last Will and Testament of Ira B. Warne" 
(hereinafter the "Codicil"). (R.360-366, 463, 482-84.) (Copies of the Partial Revocation 
and Codicil are attached hereto as Addendum H and Addendum I, respectively.) The 
Partial Revocation revoked the provision setting forth the purpose of the Trust, as well as 
the Trust's original definition of Ira's "family." (R.360-61.) The Partial Revocation also 
revoked the provision designating Tom and Jeff as successor co-trustees of the Trust. 
(R.361.) Finally, recognizing the Utah Supreme Court's opinion regarding the 
interpretation of paragraph 3.2, the Partial Revocation revoked paragraph 3.2 in its 
entirety, adding that the "Grantor [Ira] specifically wishes to preempt the results of the 
case Banks v. Means." (R.360.) 
In place of the revoked provisions, Ira inserted new paragraphs that set forth the 
purpose and distribution provisions of his Trust. (R. 361-63.) Each of these new, 
inserted paragraphs excluded Tom. For example, Ira inserted a provision entitled 
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"Primary Beneficiaries," which provided that, "[fallowing the Grantor's death, the 
Trustees shall distribute, pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, Trust Assets to the 
Primary Beneficiaries, who include those, and only those, listed by name or referred to as 
follows: Jeffrey D. Warne." (R.361.) Ira also included a new specific provision in his 
Trust that addressed his exclusion of Tom, which stated as follows: 
The Undersigned [Ira] has in mind but makes no provision herein for 
Thomas W. Warne, or his issue, or any other individual not specifically 
referred to in the Agreement by name or class, whether an heir or not. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, said 
individuals shall not be deemed "Beneficiaries" as those terms are defined 
in the Trust Agreement or in this Amendment, and shall not be entitled to 
receipt of any Trust assets. This pretermission is intentional and binding. 
(R.361-62 (emphasis added).) 
Consistent with his Partial Revocation, Ira's Codicil also amended his Last Will 
and Testament to exclude Tom as a joint personal representative of Ira's estate. (R.482.) 
On May 12, 2007, over four years after he executed the Partial Revocation and 
Codicil, Ira detailed his reasons for disinheriting Tom in a separate written letter signed 
by him. (R.486.) Ira stated, "I, Ira Warne, am an individual over 18 years of age, and of 
sound mind. I have disinherited my son Tom Warne, for the following reasons, this is 
from my own personal knowledge, and I expect my wishes to be followed." (Id.) Ira 
then listed several major disputes that he had with Tom, including a dispute that resulted 
from Tom's conduct as executor of the estate of Ira's cousin, Marian Smith. (Id.) With 
respect to this dispute, Ira stated that "[w]hen my Cousin Marian Smith died, I had to hire 
a Lawyer to receive my inheritance. This took years and [Tom] refused to pays [sic] us 
Ira had been designated a beneficiary of his cousin Marian's estate. 
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in a timely manner. Tom was the Executor of this estate and intentionally held up paying 
the heirs in the estate." (Id.) Additionally, Ira complained that, as executor, Tom "took 
the maximum Executor fee allowed by law." (Id.) 
Ira also detailed his concerns about Tom's conduct just prior to the death of 
Marian Smith, stating, 
Tom Warne and Ross Maghan stole $570,000 out of Marian Smith 
accounts when she was sick and in the Hospital. They also took $320,000 
out in the name of Farmland [a company owned by Tom and Mr. Maghan]. 
I do not understand why they believe they deserved the money? I believe 
this was a direct and intentional way to steal my money. 
(Id.) Based on Tom's actions as executor, Ira and Tom had become adverse parties in 
litigation involving the Marian Smith estate. (R.464.) 
Finally, Ira described a dispute with Tom, in which Tom purported to transfer Ira's 
and Avis Warne's interest in real property to Tom's ex-wife in Tom's divorce settlement. 
(Id.) In addressing this dispute, Ira stated as follows: 
I never had any intentions of giving my interest in the 1029 south 400 East 
apartments to Tom Warne's ex-wife Christie. I was never asked, or 
informed, about any of our interest in the 4-plexes, nor were we involved in 
Tom and Christie's divorce. We only found out about Tom and Christie's 
property settlement after the divorce papers were final. Tom Warne tried to 
give away 10% of my interest without ask[ing] or informing Avis or 
myself. No one but Avis or myself had the right to say where our interest, 
if any should go. 
At the conclusion of his letter, Ira stated, "I would appreciate my wishes to be 
followed and for nothing more to be said or acted on in regards to this matter." (Id.) 
Approximately three months after signing the letter detailing his reasons for disinheriting 
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Tom, Ira died of prostate cancer on August 27, 2007. (R.529.) Prior to and at the time of 
Ira's death, Tom had been estranged from, and had even engaged in litigation against, his 
father. (R.491.) 
On May 12, 2008, Tom filed suit against Jeff. (R.l-6.) In his complaint, Tom 
requested that he be provided with Ira's will, and he also sought to invalidate any 
amendments or changes to the Trust or Ira's will that removed Tom as a beneficiary on 
the grounds of undue influence and/or lack of testamentary capacity. (R.3-6.) Tom 
subsequently amended his complaint to request that the Partial Revocation be declared 
invalid pursuant to the holding of Banks v. Means. (R. 151-52.) In his Counterclaim, 
Jeff, individually and in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, requested a judgment 
declaring Jeff to be the sole trustee and beneficiary of the Trust. (R. 169-70.) Jeffs 
Counterclaim also requested that, in the event the district court found that the Partial 
Revocation was ineffective, the Trust be reformed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-
415 to conform to Ira's intention's regarding the distribution of his property. (R.170.) 
On July 15, 2009, Tom moved for partial summary judgment on portions of his 
First and Third Causes of Action and on Jeffs counterclaims. (R.317.) In that motion, 
Tom asserted Ira's failure to comply with the language of Banks v. Means as the only 
basis for invalidating the Partial Revocation. (R.321-24.) Both the memorandum 
supporting Tom's motion and the memorandum opposing the motion did not address the 
relevant statutory authority applicable in this case, i.e., Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605. (See 
R.317-30, 461-72.) After the motion was briefed by the parties but before oral argument, 
Jeff engaged new legal counsel to represent him. (R. 512-13.) 
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The motion for summary judgment was argued before the Honorable Robert 
Faust, the district court judge assigned to the matter. During oral argument, held on 
October 26, 2009, Jeffs new legal counsel argued the applicability of Section 75-7-605 
(enacted in 2004—two years after Banks was issued) and provided both the district court 
and opposing counsel with copies of the statutory language. (R.560:9, 25.) In discussing 
Section 75-7-605, Jeff argued that the statute, which expressly provides that substantial 
compliance is the test with which to determine whether a settlor has effectively revoked 
or amended his trust, has superseded the holding of Banks v. Means, which was issued 
two years before the adoption of Section 75-7-605 and which required strict compliance. 
(R.560:25-26.) 
Although the district court stated that it "took the matter under advisement to 
further consider the parties' written submissions, the relevant legal authority and 
counsel's oral argument," (R.518), the court's Memorandum Decision, issued November 
18, 2009, did not address the applicability of Section 75-7-605 of the Uniform Trust Act. 
(R.518-22.) Rather, the decision relied solely upon the language of Banks v. Means to 
invalidate Ira's Partial Revocation. (R.520.) Because the district court had failed to 
address the controlling authority argued at the hearing, Jeff moved the court to alter or 
amend its judgment to hold that the effectiveness of the Partial Revocation should be 
determined by Section 75-7-605, not Banks v. Means. (R. 523-25.) Without notice to the 
parties, the matter was reassigned to Judge Paul Maughan. On January 11, 2010, Judge 
Maughan issued his ruling that denied Jeffs motion to alter or amend, stating that "the 
[statutory] argument was not properly before the [c]ourt and need not have been 
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considered by the [c]ourt. Further, the [cjourt sees no legal or factual basis to otherwise 
alter or amend the Memorandum Decision." (R.552B.) The court did permit Rule 54(b) 
certification, certifying that the partial summary judgment was a final judgment as to the 
issue of Tom's claims regarding the Trust. (R.552B-552C.) The Rule 54(b) final 
judgment was entered on January 29, 2010. (R.553-56.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The position urged by Tom and adopted by the district court below is that Ira's 
expressly stated intentions regarding the distribution of his property are irrelevant to the 
resolution of Tom's claims. Indeed, Tom specifically argued below that "Ira's intent to 
disinherit [Tom] is immaterial." (R.500.) But such an argument is not supported by, and, 
in fact, is contrary to the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, which mandate that the 
provisions of the Code be "liberally construed and applied" to "discover and make 
effective the intent of a decedent in the distribution of his property." Because the district 
court failed to apply Utah law in an effort to discover and make effective Ira's intent in 
the distribution of his property, this Court should (1) reverse the district court's ruling 
that Ira's Partial Revocation is invalid, (2) reverse the district court's denial of Jeffs 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, (3) reverse the district court's refusal to reform the 
Trust pursuant to Section 75-7-415, and (4) reverse the district court's ruling that Tom is 
entitled to one-half of the personal property in Ira's estate. 
First, this Court should reverse the district court's ruling that Ira's Partial 
Revocation is invalid pursuant to the language of Banks v. Means because the factual 
circumstances of this case, which are clearly distinguishable from Banks, were not 
presented to or considered by the Banks Court. For example, unlike Banks, Ira clearly 
and unequivocally expressed his desire to disinherit Tom on multiple occasions over 
several years, and he executed the Partial Revocation to carry out his intentions. 
Moreover, unlike in Banks, Ira revoked the relevant governing provisions of his Trust 
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rather than merely amending them to ensure that the Partial Revocation would be 
effective. Given these and other facts, it was error for the district court to require a 
complete revocation and return of the property to the trustor based upon the limited and 
distinguishable facts of Banks. 
Second, the Court should hold that the district court erred by invalidating Ira's 
Partial Revocation based upon the language of Banks because the Banks decision has 
been superseded by statute. Specifically, unlike Banks, which required strict compliance 
with the terms of the trust to divest a beneficiary of an interest, Section 75-7-605 provides 
that a settlor may revoke his trust by substantially complying with the terms of the trust. 
Because Section 75-7-605 applies to all trusts created on or before July 1, 2004, the 
district court should have applied the statute in this case to properly determine whether 
the Partial Revocation was valid. By failing to do so, the district court erred. 
The district court also erred in denying Jeffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
on the ground that Jeff failed to adequately raise the applicability of Section 75-7-605. 
The record clearly establishes that counsel for Jeff argued at oral argument before the 
district court that Section 75-7-605 superseded Banks, providing the district court with an 
opportunity to rule on the issue. The district court therefore erred by failing to consider 
the applicability of Section 75-7-605, the controlling law in this case, after the statute was 
raised to the court in a timely fashion. 
Third, this Court should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
Tom on Jeffs counterclaim for reformation of Ira's Trust. The Uniform Trust Code 
expressly provides that a trust may be reformed to conform to the intention of the settlor 
4829-3754-7270/WA760-005 \ J 
if it is proved that the original terms of the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law. 
Ira's Partial Revocation demonstrated that Ira believed his Trust provided him with the 
authority to revoke the Trust, either in whole or in part. However, such a belief was, in 
fact, a mistake of law, as evidenced by the Banks' interpretation of the Trust language. 
Because Ira's Partial Revocation also clearly expressed his intention to completely 
disinherit Tom, the district court erred in refusing to reform the Trust to carry out Ira's 
expressed intentions. 
Finally, this Court should reverse the district court's ruling that Tom is entitled to 
one-half of the personal property of Ira's estate because the court failed to properly 
consider evidence of Ira's intent in light of the ambiguities present in Ira's will. Because 
the evidence before the district court clearly established that Ira intended all of his 
tangible personal property to be transferred to his Trust, the district court erred in 
granting Tom partial summary judgment on this issue. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING TOM'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE LANGUAGE OF 
BANKS WHEN THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE ARE 
CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM BANKS 
While the language of certain trust provisions at issue in Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 
65, 52 P.3d 1190, is the same language contained in Ira's Trust, all of the remaining 
relevant facts are clearly distinguishable. Consequently, because the facts, 
circumstances, and conduct of the parties in the case at bar vary substantially from those 
presented in Banks, the district court erred in invalidating Ira's Partial Revocation based 
solely upon the language of Banks. 
In interpreting the trust language in Banks, this Court held that Ms. Banks' 
purported amendment, which consisted solely of three replacement pages to be placed in 
the original trust document, was invalid because the amendment did not constitute a 
complete revocation. Banks, 2002 UT 65 at Tfl[ 5, 16. Relying on the Banks language, the 
district court in this case declared that the Partial Revocation is likewise invalid because 
it did not constitute a "complete revocation." However, in so holding, the district court 
failed to consider the distinguishing facts in this case that render the holding of Banks 
inapplicable and unjust. 
In Banks, the settlor, Ms. Banks, executed a trust in 1992. 2002 UT 65 at f 2 . The 
trust's "Purposes" section clearly stated that the trust was established for the "primary 
benefit" of Ms. Banks during her lifetime and, thereafter, for her family, which was 
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defined as Ms. Banks' three children. Id. at \ 3. The trust also provided that, upon Ms. 
Banks' death, the proceeds of the trust would be divided among Ms. Banks' three 
children. Id. As in this case, the trust specifically reserved Ms. Banks' right to amend, 
modify, or revoke the trust in section 3.1, stating: 
3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the Undersigned is alive, the 
Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in 
whole or in part, including the principal, and the present or past 
undisbursed income from such principal. Such revocation or amendment of 
this Trust may be in whole or in part by written instrument. Amendment, 
modification or revocation of this instrument shall be effective only when 
such change is delivered in writing to the then acting Trustee. On the 
revocation of this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to the 
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of 
revocation, all of the Trust property. 
Id. at Tf 4. 
The Banks trust also contained a section regarding the interests of beneficiaries 
that is identical to paragraph 3.2 of Ira's Trust. That section provided as follows: 
3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries are 
presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until 
this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death. As long as this 
Trust subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and privileges 
hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by the Trustee named herein in 
their fiduciary capacity. 
Id. 
In August 1999, only two weeks before her dearth,4 Ms. Banks executed an 
amendment to the trust, which consisted only of "three replacement pages inserted into 
4
 As discussed in the appellate briefs in the Banks case, the circumstances surrounding 
the purported amendment to Ms. Banks' trust were suspect, to say the least. Ms. Banks 
executed the trust, which designated each of her three children as beneficiaries, in 1992. 
(Reply [sic] Brief of Appellees at 5-6.) Ms. Banks never had a falling out with any of her 
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the trust document." Id, at \ 5. The amendment did not modify the purpose of the trust, 
as set forth in Article I, nor did it modify the definition of Ms. Banks' family as originally 
defined in the trust. Id, Instead, the amendment simply changed the beneficiary and the 
successor trustee provisions so that Ms. Banks' older sister, Ms. Means, would be the 
sole beneficiary and the successor trustee after Ms. Banks' death. Id, 
After summary judgment was granted to the Banks' children, this Court was asked 
to determine the validity of the purported amendment to Ms. Banks' trust. Recognizing 
that, pursuant to the language of Ms. Banks' trust, "[Revocation is ... a specific provision 
of the trust language and is not the same as an amendment or modification" id. at \ 11 
(emphasis added), this Court held that the "plain language" of section 3.2 provided that 
"the beneficiaries have 'vested interests' that continue until the interests are 'revoked or 
terminated.'" Id, at f 12 (footnote omitted). The Court then declared that, "[t]hus, a 
children, and, in fact, in February of 1999, Ms. Banks gave her original 1992 trust to one 
of her daughters "for safekeeping," with the instruction that she would "need those 
documents upon [Ms. Banks'] passing." {Id, at 7-8.) 
In early 1999, Ms. Banks' health deteriorated such that Ms. Banks required 
extended hospitalization. {Id, at 7.) While Ms. Banks was in the hospital, Kevin Reeves, 
a "confidant" of Ms. Means, Ms. Banks' older sister, began making multiple calls to Ms. 
Banks' attorney for the purpose of amending Ms. Banks' trust to name Ms. Means as the 
sole beneficiary of the trust. {Id. at 5, 7-8, 10.) Ms. Banks' attorney eventually prepared 
three pages of "proposed changes" to Ms. Banks' trust, which he presented to Ms. Banks 
in the hospital approximately two weeks before her death. {Id, at 11, 13.) It was later 
discovered that Kevin Reeves was designated as the sole beneficiary of the estate of Ms. 
Means. {Id. at 13-14.) 
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complete revocation was required to divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests." 5 
Id. 
Ultimately, this Court held that the three page "amendment" to the trust was not 
sufficient to divest Ms. Banks' children of their interest under section 3.2, "which 
provide[d] that beneficiary interests are only subject to divestiture via a revocation of the 
trust." Id. at Tf 15. In support of its holding, this Court noted that, if the "amendment" 
were to be given effect, it would "render some language null and void, and contravene 
the stated purpose of the [trust]." Id. at f 15 n.5. The Court, therefore, affirmed the 
district court's grant of summary judgment to the Banks children. 
Although Ira's Trust originally contained the same language as found in sections 
3.1 and 3.2 of Ms. Banks' trust,6 that is the only similarity between the two cases. Ira 
executed his Partial Revocation in 2003, 4 Vi years prior to his death, and there is no 
evidence even suggesting that Ira was persuaded or compelled in any way by anyone to 
sign the Partial Revocation. (R.364, 529.) To the contrary, the evidence in this case 
establishes that Ira clearly intended to disinherit Tom by executing the Partial 
Revocation. (R.361-62.) Indeed, Ira reaffirmed his intent to disinherit Tom in 2007, over 
5
 Given the Court's ruling that a revocation was not the same as an amendment, this 
Court should not deem controlling the statement in Banks that a "complete revocation" is 
required by section 3.2 to divest a beneficiary of an interest in the trust. Indeed, because 
the determination in Banks simply required the Court to determine that a three page 
amendment was insufficient to divest a beneficiary's interest under section 3.2's 
requirement that the trust be revoked, the statement regarding a "complete revocation" 
was not an issue "essential or necessary for the determination of the question involved" 
and, therefore, is not "authoritative or binding upon the court in the case at bar." Salt 
Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P. 234, 237 (Utah 1923), superseded by statute on other grounds. 
6
 Ira's Trust was prepared by the same attorney that prepared Ms. Banks' trust. 
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four years after signing the Partial Revocation and three months before his death, when 
he prepared and signed a letter in which he detailed the many disputes he had had with 
Tom, including disputes which led him to believe that Tom had attempted to steal his 
money. (R.486.) 
More importantly, however, unlike in Banks, Ira did not execute "amendment" 
pages which simply attempted to replace original pages of his Trust with "amended" 
pages, while leaving the purpose of the Trust and other provisions unchanged. Rather, 
Ira executed a Partial Revocation, in which he specifically revoked certain provisions of 
his Trust, including the stated purpose of the Trust, the definition of Ira's family, and the 
beneficiary and trustee provisions. (R.360-66.) Additionally, unlike in Banks, Ira 
revoked paragraph 3.2 in its entirety. In so doing, Ira stated as follows: 
Grantor [Ira] interprets the phrase "until this Trust is revoked" found in 
paragraph 3.2 to mean "revocation ... of this Trust ... in whole or in part" 
(paragraph 3.1), rather than "revocation of this instrument in its entirety" 
(paragraph 3.1), noting that the latter phrase is used to define the specific 
and narrow circumstance and time as to when the Trustees are to deliver all 
trust property to the Undersigned, thus indicating that the word "revoked" 
found in paragraph 3.2 in fact means "revoked in whole or in part." 
(R.360.) 
After revoking these provisions, Ira also caused new provisions to be inserted into 
his Trust to replace those sections he had revoked. Ira's insertions clearly and 
unambiguously established that Ira intended to divest Tom of all interest in the Trust. 
Indeed, in the amended "Purposes" section of his Trust, Ira expressly declared that 
The Undersigned [Ira] has in mind but makes no provision herein for 
Thomas W. Warne, or his issue, or any other individual not specifically 
referred to in the Agreement by name or class, whether an heir or not. 
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Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, said 
individuals shall not be deemed "Beneficiaries" as those terms are defined 
in the Trust Agreement or in this Amendment, and shall not be entitled to 
receipt of any Trust assets. This pretermission is intentional and binding. 
(R.361-62.) 
Thus, unlike in Banks, after learning that the Utah Supreme Court had interpreted 
language in his Trust in a manner inconsistent with his intent, Ira took affirmative steps to 
clarify his intent and to revoke and modify the governing provisions of his Trust to 
conform to his original intent that he be allowed to revoke any provision of the Trust, 
either in whole or in part, at any point during his lifetime. (R. 360.) Given that "the 
primary object of a court, in construing the provisions of a trust, is to carry out the intent 
of the trustor or trustors," In re Gerber, 652 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1982), the district court 
erred in disregarding Ira's stated intentions and his revisions to the governing provisions 
of his Trust. 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY SECTION 
75-7-605 
As discussed more fully below, Section 75-7-605 is the controlling law governing 
the question of whether the Partial Revocation should be given effect. Because the 
district court did not apply the provisions of Section 75-7-605, either in its Memorandum 
Decision or in its review of Jeff s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, the district court 
erred in concluding that Tom was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district 
court's judgment should therefore be reversed. 
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a. The District Court Erred in Holding that the Partial Revocation 
Is Invalid for Failure to Comply with Banks v. Means when Banks Has Been 
Superseded By Statute 
Because Banks has been superseded by the adoption of Section 75-7-605 of the 
Utah Code, the district court erred when it failed to apply the statute and instead 
invalidated the Partial Revocation based solely upon the language of Banks. In Banks, 
this Court was asked to resolve the validity of a purported amendment to Ms. Banks' 
trust. Recognizing the common law rule that "a settlor has the power to modify or revoke 
a trust only if and to the extent that such power is explicitly reserved by the terms of the 
trust," Banks, 2002 UT 65 at *| 9, the Banks Court began its analysis "with an 
examination of the original trust language." Id. 
The Banks Court first determined that, pursuant to the language of the trust at 
issue, the settlor had reserved "the right to amend, modify or revoke" the trust "in whole 
or in part." Id. at \ 10. However, the Banks Court then held that such power was 
expressly limited by the language of section 3.2 of that trust, which provided that "[t]he 
interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to divestment which 
shall continue until this [t]rust is revoked or terminated other than by death." Id. at % 12. 
Because the trust stated that the beneficiaries had "Vested interests' that continue until 
the interests are 'revoked or terminated,'" the Court interpreted the language of the trust 
as requiring "a complete revocation ... to divest the beneficiaries of their vested 
interests." Id. The Court then held that Ms. Banks' purported "amendment" was invalid 
because it failed to comply with the terms of the trust. Id. at Tf 16. 
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Two years after the Banks opinion was issued, the Utah Legislature enacted 
Section 75-7-605 of the Utah Uniform Trust Code. In contrast to the holding in Banks, 
which required strict compliance with the terms of the trust, the Uniform Trust Code 
provides that an amendment or revocation to a trust is effective despite the settlor's 
failure to strictly comply with the terms of his or her trust. Indeed, Section 75-7-605 
provides that a settlor may effectively revoke or amend his or her trust 
(a) by substantially complying with a method provided in the terms of the trust; or 
(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided in the 
terms is not expressly made exclusive, by: 
(i) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or specifically 
devises property that would otherwise have passed according to the terms of the 
trust; or 
(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's 
intent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3) (2009) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code, of which Utah's Trust Code forms a part, 
mandates that the Code shall be "liberally construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purposes and policies," which include "[t]o discover and make effective the 
intent of a decedent in distribution of his property." Id. § 75-1-102(1), (2)(b) (2009). To 
this end, the provisions of the Uniform Trust Code, including Section 75-7-605(3), apply 
to "all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2004," as well as "all judicial 
proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after July 1, 2004" Id. § 75-7-
1103(l)(a), (b) (2009) (emphasis added). 
Despite the provisions of Section 75-7-605, which unquestionably should have 
been applied to Ira's Trust and Partial Revocation, the district court did not apply that 
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section's "substantial compliance" standard to determine the validity of Ira's Partial 
Revocation. Rather, the district court applied the strict compliance standard set forth in 
Banks, holding, "this [c]ourt cannot override Banks by interpreting the Ira Trust language 
as requiring merely a partial revocation when the Utah Supreme Court has clearly 
indicated that a complete revocation and a return of property is required." (R.520.) 
Had the district court properly applied the controlling law in this case, it would 
have been required to consider and determine an issue of fact of whether Ira had 
substantially complied with the terms of his Trust before it could effectively rule on 
Tom's motion for partial summary judgment. Such a determination would have required 
the district court to consider whether "the deviation from the ... requirements [would] ... 
in any real substantial measure ... frustrate^ the purpose" of the Trust. Joseph A, v. New 
Mexico Dept of Human Servs., 69 F.3d 1081, 1085, 1086 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal 
quotations omitted) (third and fourth alterations in original). Despite its failure to 
perform such an analysis to determine whether Ira had substantially complied with the 
terms of his Trust, the district court nonetheless ruled that Tom was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. In so doing, the district court erred. 
Applying the controlling law in this case, it is clear Ira substantially complied with 
the provisions of his Trust when he executed his Partial Revocation in 2003. First, there 
can be no question that the purpose of Ira's Trust was to effectuate the distribution of 
Ira's property after his death in accordance with his expressed desires, intentions, and 
instructions. Thus, the question becomes did execution of the Partial Revocation, as 
opposed to a complete revocation, frustrate that purpose. The answer is undisputedly 
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"No." Ira expressly and unambiguously stated his intention and desire to disinherit Tom, 
and the Partial Revocation modified the Trust to accomplish Ira's intended distribution. 
Ira's execution of the Partial Revocation did not frustrate but rather furthered the purpose 
of his Trust.7 Accordingly, this Court should hold that the Utah Trust Code applies, that 
Banks is not controlling, and that Ira substantially complied with the terms of his Trust 
when he fully executed the Partial Revocation, in which he clearly and unequivocally set 
forth his intention to disinherit Tom. Because the district court failed to apply Section 
75-7-605, the controlling law in this case, its ruling that Tom is entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law should be reversed. 
b. The District Court Erred in Denying Jeffs Rule 59(e) Motion to 
Alter or Amend 
In addition to failing to apply the controlling law when initially determining the 
validity of the Partial Revocation, the district court also erred when it failed to remedy its 
error as requested in Jeffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Because the district 
court's Memorandum Decision did not address the application of Section 75-7-605 
despite argument raised before the district court during the hearing, Jeff moved the 
district court to alter or amend its judgment to specifically address the impact that statute 
had on the issue before the court. In that motion, Jeff again argued that Section 75-7-605 
controlled the district court's determination of the enforceability of the Partial 
Revocation. (R.530-33.) The district court refused to alter its judgment, however, and 
7
 It should be noted that, other than his reliance on the language in the Banks opinion, 
Tom has not advanced any argument or rationale for the necessity of a "complete 
revocation." 
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instead held that the applicability of Section 75-7-605 had not been properly raised. 
(R.552B.) In so holding, the district court erred because application of the statute had 
been properly and timely raised before the court. 
An issue is properly raised and before the district court and, therefore, preserved 
for appellate review when the district court is "offered an opportunity to rule on [the] 
issue." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). The test for 
determining whether a district court has been afforded "an opportunity to rule" on an 
issue consists of three parts: "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the 
issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
With respect to the first requirement, i.e., raised in a timely fashion, this Court has 
held that an issue is raised in a timely fashion if it was presented to the district court 
"prior to the ruling on the motion" at issue. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 
659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983); accord Travelers Ins. Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 846 
F.2d 1048, 1054 n.l (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that issue raised in supplemental brief "filed 
after the hearing but before the district court rendered its decision" was "sufficiently 
presented to the district court for purposes of preserving the argument for appellate 
review"). Moreover, an issue is "sufficiently raised" if it is "raised to a level of 
consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it." Groberg v. Housing 
Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67, If 19, 68 P.3d 1015 (internal quotations omitted). 
In this case, the district court was properly afforded the opportunity to rule on the 
issue of whether Section 75-7-605 applied. Indeed, Jeffs counsel not only raised the 
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statute during oral argument on Tom's motion for partial summary judgment, he also 
provided the district court and counsel with a copy of the statute. (R.560:9, 25.) In 
arguing that Section 75-7-605 changed or modified the ruling of Banks, Jeffs counsel 
stated as follows: 
I think the language of all the cases, if you will, says that you have to look 
at the trust document, interpret what the trust document says, but 605 is 
very clear that the settlor may revoke or amend an irrevocable trust by 
substantially complying with the method provided in the terms of the trust 
or any other method that manifests clear and convincing evidence of the 
settlor's intent. 
(R.560:25, 26.) Clearly, Jeffs argument, which cited specifically to the controlling 
statute, raised the applicability of Section 75-7-605 to a level of consciousness such that 
the district court could and should have considered it. Moreover, this issue raised at oral 
argument was timely. Thus, the district court erred in failing to apply Section 75-7-605 
and in even failing to address the statute in its Memorandum Decision. 
In denying Jeffs Motion to Alter or Amend, Judge Maughan, who did not hear the 
earlier argument, stated that the application of Section 75-7-605 was not properly before 
the district court because Jeff failed to address the statute in his written memorandum 
opposing Tom's motion for partial summary judgment. However, such a ruling is 
erroneous. Utah's courts have recognized that an issue may be raised orally at a hearing 
before the district court. Indeed, in Franklin Financial, this Court recognized that it is 
possible to raise an argument orally at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, 
holding that the party asserting that the issue had been preserved is required to provide a 
complete record to establish that the issue was in fact raised during the hearing. 659 P.2d 
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at 1045; see also In re Estate of Rison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1018 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
("In their reply brief, though, the Morrisons contend they did preserve this argument by 
raising it during oral argument on the motion. However, we have no record that there 
was oral argument on that particular motion. And, even if there was oral argument, we 
have no transcript of the hearing. Thus, we have no record that this argument was 
preserved."). In the instant case, the argument was raised and argued at the oral argument 
hearing before the district court, and the record transcript of that argument has been 
provided to this Court. (R.560.) {See Addendum D.) 
Courts throughout the country have similarly held that an issue is preserved if it is 
raised orally at a hearing before the district court. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. 
United States, 173 F.3d 898, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs' "oral 
argument [at the combined summary judgment/preliminary injunction hearing] on the 
felon-misdemeanant distinction was enough to satisfy the general requirement that an 
issue on appeal be raised in the trial court."); Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Ariz., Inc. v. 
McKinney, 946 P.2d 464, 468 n.5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the defendant 
"sufficiently preserved" an issue for appellate review because his "attorney referred to the 
causation issue at oral argument on the motions for summary judgment"); McGinley v. 
Bank of America, 109 P.3d 1146, 1157 (Kan. 2005) ("The record on appeal reveals 
McGinley argued this issue, without objection by the Bank, at the hearing on the Bank's 
motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, it is sufficiently raised for our 
consideration on appeal."); Black v. Powers, 628 S.E.2d 546, 553 n.7 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding that the issue was "sufficiently preserved for purposes of appeal" when the 
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plaintiff "clearly argued that the law of the Virgin Islands should apply [during oral 
arguments before the trial court]"). 
Because Jeff argued to the district court that the more recently enacted Section 75-
7-605 applied to the determination of the enforceability of the Partial Revocation at such 
a time and in such a manner that the court was afforded an opportunity to rule on the 
issue, the district court not only erred in refusing to address the issue properly raised 
before the court, but it also acted in a manner contrary to public policy. See Thurston v. 
Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 168 n.3 (Utah 1992) (holding that, although the "parties 
and the district court did not address the effect of [Section 17-33-5]," the Court will 
"consider the statute's effect on this case sua sponte because it is controlling and it would 
be contrary to public policy to decline to do so."). Consequently, this Court should 
reverse the district court's denial of Jeffs Motion to Alter or Amend and hold that the 
court must consider and apply the controlling statutory law in this case. 
3, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REFORM 
IRA'S TRUST WHEN IRA'S INTENT THAT HE BE ALLOWED TO REVOKE 
THE TRUST IN PART WAS SHOWN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE 
The district court also erred when it refused to reform the Trust pursuant to 
Section 75-7-415. That section provides as follows: 
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform 
the terms to the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were 
affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415. The Uniform Law Comments to Section 75-7-415 explain 
that, "[i]n determining the settlor's original intent, the court may consider evidence 
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relevant to the settlor's intention even though it contradicts an apparent plain meaning of 
the text." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415 cmt. Additionally, the comments note that, 
"[b]ecause reformation may involve the addition of language to the instrument, or the 
deletion of language that may appear clear on its face, reliance on extrinsic evidence is 
essential." Id. 
Despite Jeffs counterclaim for reformation of the Trust pursuant to Section 75-7-
415 to conform to Ira's stated intentions, the district court refused to apply Section 75-7-
415 and instead granted summary judgment in favor of Tom. In support of its ruling, the 
district court opined that 
[t]his is not a case where the settlor was mistaken about the law or was 
unclear about how to accomplish his purposes. Instead, being fully aware 
of Banks, Ira and his counsel simply sought to accomplish an end run 
around this opinion. Under these unusual circumstances, the Court is 
unable to allow reformation where the purpose is clearly to circumvent 
existing case law. 
(R.520.) 
However, in so reasoning, the district court failed to consider that the Partial 
Revocation evidenced that Ira's original Trust was in fact affected by a mistake of law. 
As clearly shown in the Partial Revocation, Ira intended the phrase found in paragraph 
3.2 "until this Trust is revoked" to mean revocation in whole or in part. (R.360.) Thus, 
Ira did not intend the language of paragraph 3.2 to convey a presently vested interest to 
Tom that would restrict Ira's right to subsequently revoke the Trust in part. As 
recognized by this Court, the inclusion of language similar to that found in paragraph 3.2 
in trusts drafted in Utah appeared to be the result of the Court's prior statement that "a 
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trust is invalid unless the beneficiary's interest vests during the settlor's lifetime." 
Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, ^ 11 n.2, 169 P.3d 750. Unfortunately, however, use of 
language similar to that of paragraph 3.2 has had "the potential to produce results not 
within the contemplation of the drafters of trusts or their clients" because "the insertion of 
language proclaiming that the beneficiaries have a 'present interest' simply contradicts 
the operative terms of the trust." Id. 
Given that this Court has recognized that the phrase "vested interest subject to 
divestment" is essentially "an oxymoron," id., it is apparent that the inclusion of such 
language by Ira's counsel in the Trust was due to a mistake of law. Consequently, 
viewing all facts and inferences in favor of Jeff, the district court should have found that 
a disputed issue of fact exists as to whether Ira's mistake of law affected the Trust. 
Because it failed to do so and instead entered judgment in favor of Tom on Jeffs claim of 
reformation, the district court should be reversed. 
4. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT TOM WAS 
ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF IRA'S 
ESTATE WHEN THE PROVISIONS OF THE WILL WERE AMBIGUOUS 
Finally, the district court erred in ruling that Tom was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on his claim under Ira's will because the provisions of the will are 
ambiguous. In ruling that Tom was entitled to one-half of the personal property included 
in Ira's estate, the district court stated only that the Codicil executed by Ira at the time he 
executed the Partial Revocation "did not change the distribution provisions of the Will." 
(R.52L) The district court never addressed Jeffs argument that the distribution 
provisions of the will were ambiguous. (R.560:20.) Because such an issue should have 
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been resolved prior to ruling on Tom's motion for partial summary judgment, see 
Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, f 14, 48 P.3d 918 (holding that "a motion for 
summary judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity 
exists in the contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended"), the 
district court's ruling should be reversed. 
As stated in In re Estate ofAshton, 804 P.2d 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
[i]n construing a will, a court must look to the testator's intent as expressed 
in the will. The intent may be ascertained not alone from the provision 
itself, but from a scrutiny of the entire instrument of which it is a part, and 
in light of the conditions and circumstances in which the instrument came 
into existence. Thus, extrinsic evidence may be used to ascertain what the 
testator intended. 
Id. at 542 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The pertinent distribution provisions of Ira's will provide as follows: 
2.1(a) Tangible Personal Property—Gift by Written Statement. I give my 
tangible personal property not otherwise specifically devised in this Will, 
except any such property which, at the time of my death, is used in a trade 
or business, in accordance with a written statement signed by me or in my 
handwriting which I intend to leave at my death. 
2.1(b) Contingent Gift. I give all of my tangible personal property not 
effectively disposed of by such written statement, or otherwise specifically 
devised in this Will, except any such property which, at the time of my 
death, is used in a trade or business, ... to my issue who survive me, by 
representation, to be divided among them as they shall agree .... 
2.2 Pour-Over to Family Protection Trust. On the 15th day of July, 1991,1 
executed a written Trust Agreement entitled the IRA B. WARNE Family 
Protection Trust. That Trust and this Will form part of an integrated plan 
to provide for the disposition of my estate upon my death and both 
instruments should be construed and administered accordingly. I hereby 
give, devise and bequeath all of my property, not effectively disposed of by 
the above described written statement or by other provisions of this Will, 
whether real, personal, or mixed, and wherever situate to the Trustee of 
4829-3754-7270/WA760-005 35 
such Trust, in trust, to be administered and distributed pursuant to the 
provisions of such Trust including any amendments made subsequent to the 
execution of this Will that are in effect at the time of my death. 
(R.354 (emphasis added).) (A copy of the Last Will and Testament of Ira B. Warne is 
attached hereto as Addendum J.) 
Thus, Section 2.1(b), by its plain language, provides that, in the event Ira did not 
execute a written statement regarding the disposition of his personal property, the 
personal property should be divided among Ira's children if the property is not "otherwise 
specifically devised in this Will." (Id.) Similarly, in Section 2.2, Ira specifically devises 
to the Trust all of Ira's personal property if "not effectively disposed of by the above 
described written statement or by other provisions of this Will." (Id.) 
Given that both Section 2.1(b) and 2.2 are contingent upon the fact that the 
personal property is not otherwise disposed of by another portion of the will, the 
provisions create a circularity that cannot be resolved merely by reference to the plain 
language of the will. Moreover, because Ira expressly stated in his will that he intended 
that his Trust and his will "form part of an integrated plan to provide for the disposition 
of [his] estate upon [his] death and both instruments should be construed and 
administered accordingly," the district court should have reviewed Ira's Trust to properly 
interpret Ira's intent with respect to the distribution of his personal property. 
Had it done so, it would have discovered that Ira transferred all of his property, 
including all of his personal property, to the Trust at the time of its creation. (R.349, 
351.) Indeed, in Schedule A to the Trust, Ira transferred, sold, assigned, and conveyed 
"[a]ny and all personal property now owned and hereafter acquired by the Undersigned 
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[Ira]" with "all right, title, interest, and obligations pertaining thereto, to the Trustees, 
subject to the terms and conditions of the IRA B. WARNE Family Living Trust, dated 
the 15th day of July, 1991." (R.349 (emphasis added).) Such property specifically 
included "personal and household articles." (R.351.) Clearly, this Schedule to Ira's 
Trust, which must be construed in accordance with the provisions of Ira's will, 
demonstrates that Ira intended to have all of his property, including his tangible personal 
property either owned at the time he executed his Trust or acquired thereafter, devised to 
the Trust and to be administered under the provisions of the Trust. Because the district 
court refused to consider this evidence and instead held that Tom was entitled to one-half 
of the personal property of Ira's estate pursuant to Section 2.1(b), the district court erred 
as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The question before this Court is whether Ira's intentions regarding the 
distribution of his property, which are unambiguous and are unequivocally stated, should 
be disregarded because his counsel failed to strictly comply with the provisions of the 
Trust as interpreted by the Banks Court. The answer is clearly "No." The Uniform Trust 
Code expressly provides that the law in Utah should be liberally construed to effectuate 
the intent of a decedent with respect to the distribution of his property. Because Ira 
specifically expressed his intent to disinherit Tom, this Court should hold that Ira's 
Partial Revocation is valid and should be given effect. 
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25 
and redo -- I mean, there might be a variety of reasons for 
that, but I don't think that that's necessarily even relevant 
to the Court now in the context of summary judgment. Other 
questions? Thank you. 
My co-counsel reminds me, your Honor, that I haven't 
talked about Section 605 and 606. They are there in the book. 
THE COURT: I did have another question. That 
reminds me before you go tell me how you think the new Uniform 
Trust Code changed or modifies the ruling that came down in 
Banks. 
MR. NIELSEN: 605 and 606, your Honor. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible.) 
MR. NIELSEN: Yeah, that's what they say. And they 
say that under the Uniform Trust Code the beneficiary does not 
have a vested interest in the property, at least unless the 
trust document says otherwise, at least that's as I read it. 
THE COURT: But this trust document in issue did say 
they had a vested interest, right? 
MR. NIELSEN: It did. And he said I intended my 
language to allow me to do that and to revoke that even in 
part. 
THE COURT: Yeah, that's assuming that that provision 
is considered valid. 
MR. NIELSEN: That's -- that would be a separate 
consideration. 
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1 THE COURT: But that aside you're not saying that 
2 without this partial revocation there is no -- let me back up, 
3 vesting simply because of these 606 and 605 provisions because 
4 I we do have a specific indication they should vest and that 
5 would be --
6 MR. NIELSEN: I think --
7 THE COURT: Right? 
8 MR. NIELSEN: Yeah, I think the language of all the 
9 cases, if you will, says that you have to look at the trust 
10 document, interpret what the trust document says, but 605 is 
11 very clear that the settlor may revoke or amend an irrevocable 
12 trust by substantially complying with the method provided in 
13 the terms of the trust or any other method that manifests clear 
14 and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent. And in 606 it 
15 talks about the powers of withdrawal, but what's important. I 
16 think here when it talks about powers of withdrawal, the holder 
17 of a power of withdrawal has the rights of a settlor over a 
18 revocable trust under this section to the extent the property 
19 is subject to the power. 
20 And I think I don't know whether we got the comment 
21 in your Honor's copy, but the comment I think to 606 is very 
22 clear. It says this section has the effect of postponing 
23 enforcement of the rights of the beneficiaries of a revocable 
24 trust until the death or incapacity of the settlor. This 
25 section thus recognizes that the settlor of a revocable trust 
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is in control of the trust and should have the right to enforce 
the trust. And then it goes on to say that the rights of the 
beneficors such as they are held by the beneficiaries, but the 
Subsection A of 606 says that the rights to the settlor of a 
revocable trust remains with the settlor while he has capacity. 
And in this case there's no question at least for the purposes 
of summary judgment that he did not have capacity. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Munsun. 
MR. MUNSUN: Thank you, your Honor. I just would 
note that this is a completely new argument. It doesn't appear 
in their brief with regard to Section 605 and 606. And in the 
two minutes I've had to look at it, it seems to me it doesn't 
apply anyway, but I'll get to that at the end. 
The part of the problem with their argument with 
regard to the other code section, the section that allows the 
Court to modify provisions of a trust, is that their own 
counterclaim says that they want an order reforming the terms 
of the Ira B. Warne Family Protection Trust to conform with the 
clear desires of Ira B. Warne. They've told us what the 
desires of Ira B. Warne were in 2003. They haven't said 
anything about what his desires were in 1991 when he changed 
the trust. There would have had to have been a mistake of fact 
or law in 1991 when he signed that trust, they would have to 
have clear and convincing evidence of that to win. They have 
to have at least some evidence of that it seems to me to get 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
32 
1 initial trust that limited their ability to make that change? 
2 And the language is identical in both cases. There's no way 
3 around that by changing --by slightly modifying it to call it 
4 instead of an amendment to call it a partial revocation or 
5 whatever. The case says it's got to be a complete revocation. 
6 Now, I'd like to talk if I might on -- oh, and also 
7 counsel went through a long recitation of facts about why Ira 
8 wanted to disinherit my client. All of that -- you know, 
9 there's certainly disputes as to all of that, but for purposes 
10 of this motion we agree it's all true. The problem is is that 
11 it's completely irrelevant. We don't dispute he wanted to do 
12 it. And why he wanted to do it doesn't matter. The fact is he 
13 didn't do it the way he forced himself to do it. 
14 I would like to talk briefly about these statutes. 
15 And, again, this is the first time I've heard that they were 
16 going to be applied here, but Subparagraph 1 of 605 says at 
17 least as to that Subparagraph it doesn't apply to any trust 
18 created before May 1, 2 004. This clearly is one of those. And 
19 the -- and it does -- again, it's sort of on the fly here, your 
20 Honor, but it says if the terms of the trust do not provide a 
21 method or method provided in the terms not expressly made 
22 exclusive, that is 3-b, well, I think it does make --it 
23 provides an exclusive way of revoking or modifying this trust. 
24 This is -- I'm reading 605-3-b -- and in a very exclusive way 
25 of doing it it said you had to revoke this trust or terminate 
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it other than by death. 
So, again, I don't think that applies. 606 I don't 
think even has anything to do with this. It's a power to 
withdraw by the settlor so the settlor -- we're not talking 
about whether or not Ira took something out of the trust. 
Presumably if he had taken everything out of the trust and put 
it in the new trust I wouldn't be standing here today because 
he would have done what his trust required him to do. He 
didn't do that. He tried to skip a couple of steps. Banks 
versus Means says you can't do that. And so, your Honor, I 
think we should apply Banks versus Means to this situation. It 
clearly applies and we should receive summary judgment on all 
three issues. Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, if you'd allow me just two 
comments. I admit that I took too much time over in family 
relations and with the commissioners and I guess they let 
everybody talk, but I just wanted to point out quickly the 
difference between this case and the example that counsel gives 
is that it's his television set. It's his television set. And 
if I walk into Sears with my television set and walk out with 
my television set, I guess I have the right to walk out with 
it. 
Secondly, I think I just need to remind the Court the 
purpose of the code is to discover and put into effect the 
intent of the decedent. I think that's what the Court needs to 
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This matter came before the Court for hearing on October 26, 2009, 
in connection with the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement to further consider the parties' written submissions, the 
relevant legal authority and counsel's oral argument. Being now fully 
informed, the Court rules as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Plaintiff's Motion seeks Partial Summary Judgment on the 
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and the Defendant's Counterclaim. 
At issue is a May 9, 2003, Partial Revocation of and Amendment ("Partial 
Revocation") to the Ira B. Warne Family Protection Trust ("Ira Trust") 
which was executed by Ira B. Warne ("Ira"). The Plaintiff seeks, in 
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part, a declaration that the Partial Revocation is invalid because it 
fails to follow Banks v. Means, 52 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2002). The 
Defendant's Counterclaim, in turn, seeks a declaration that the Partial 
Revocation resulted in the Defendant being the sole trustee and 
beneficiary of the Ira Trust. The Second Cause of Action of the 
Counterclaim seeks a reformation of the Ira Trust to comport with Ira's 
intent. 
The first issue that the Court addresses is the validity of the 
Partial Revocation. Under Section 3.2 of the Ira Trust, the interests of 
the beneficiaries of that Trust were "vested interests subject to 
divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated 
other than by death." In Banks, the Utah Supreme Court addressed 
identical language as barring the complete divestiture of a beneficiary's 
interest absent revocation or termination of the trust, with the assets 
being returned to the settlor. Id. at 1192. The amendment in that case 
was deemed invalid because it was not a complete revocation and the 
assets had not been returned to the settlor. Id. 
Notably, since the Partial Revocation specifically refers to Banks, 
it is apparent that the drafters were aware that a full revocation was 
required. Nevertheless, in an apparent attempt to "preempt" Banks., the 
drafters proceeded with a partial revocation. The Defendant now 
maintains that Banks "went too far" and that a partial revocation is all 
that is required by the language of the Ira Trust. 
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After considering the foregoing, the Court determines that the 
Partial Revocation is invalid. The drafters' (and, as a corollary, 
the settlor's) attempt to interpret the Ira Trust language, which 
is identical to Banks, in a way that is contradictory to Banks is 
ineffective. Moreover, this Court cannot override Banks by interpreting 
the Ira Trust language as requiring merexy a partial revocation when the 
Utah Supreme Court has clearly indicated that a complete revocation and 
a return of property is required. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment seeking to declare the Partial Revocation 
as invalid is granted. 
The Defendant suggests that this Court should reform the terms of 
the Ira Trust in such a way as to render the Partial Revocation valid. 
In making this argument, the Defendant is again seeking to preempt the 
implications of Banks. The Court is not persuaded that there is any 
legal basis to reform the Ira Trust such that reformation would be 
appropriate. This is not a case where the settlor was mistaken about the 
law or was unclear about how to accomplish his purposes. Instead, being 
fully aware of Banks, Ira and his counsel simply sought to accomplish an 
end run around this opinion. Under these unusual circumstances, the 
Court is unable to allow reformation where the purpose is clearly to 
circumvent existing case law. 
Next, the Plaintiff has raised an issue concerning Ira's personal 
property. The Court agrees that Ira's Codicil amended Paragraph 3.1, 
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which designates his personal representative. The Codicil did not change 
the distribution provisions of the Will. The Court rules that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to one-half of the personal property included in 
Ira's estate. 
Finally, the Defendant has not addressed the Plaintiff's arguments 
in regard to the Third Cause of Action of the Complaint. Accordingly, 
the Court grants Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment in the entirety. This Memorandum Decision will 
stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this jT day of November, 2009. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS WARNE/ individually and as : RULING AND ORDER ON RULE 
Trustee of the Avis P. Warne Family 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
Protection Trust and the Ira B. : 
Warne Family Protection Trust/ CASE NO. 080907826 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY WARNE, individually and as 
Trustee of the Avis P. Warne : 
Family Protection Trust and the 
Ira B. Warne Family Protection : 
Trust, 
Defendant. 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the 
defendant seeking a ruling on his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement or, 
in the Alternative, to Certify Ruling as Final Pursuant to Rule b4(b). 
Having reviewed the moving and responding Memoranda, the Court rules as 
stated herein. 
The defendant's Motion effectively seeks the reconsideration of the 
prior Judge's ruling on the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. That ruling was contained in a Memorandum Decision, dated 
November 18, 2009. The defendant now asserts that this ruling was based 
exclusively on the case of Banks v. Means, 52 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2002), and 
did not take into consideration the implications of Utah Code Ann., § 75-
7-605(3) . It appears that the defense counsel mentioned this Section at 
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the oral argument on the plaintiff's Motion, but did not expressly rely 
on this statute in the defendant's Opposition. Nevertheless, the 
defendant maintains that counsel preserved the issue by raising it at the 
hearing. 
The plaintiff makes the valid point that defense counsel raising the 
statute for the first time at oral argument was procedural!^7 im^ro^er. 
In essence, the defendant now seeks to bolster his opposition to the 
plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the context of his 
present Motion, rather than during the original briefing and specifically 
in his Opposition. The case law that holds that the appellate courts are 
not required to address issues that were not briefed apply equally at the 
trial court level. Indeed, were it otherwise, parties could gain 
tactical advantage by purposely omitting arguments from their briefs and 
instead raising them for the first time during oral argument when the 
other side is ill-prepared to address them. Clearly, this runs counter 
to the purpose of motion pleading. Therefore, the Court is satisfied 
that this argument was not properly before the Court and need not have 
been considered by the Court. Further, the Court sees no legal or 
factual basis to otherwise alter or amend the Memorandum Decision. 
Based on the foregoing, the defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment is denied. Since the plaintiff does not object to the Court 
certifying the Memorandum Decision as a final Judgment under Rule 54(b) 
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of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant's Motion to Certify 
is granted. 
This Ruling and Order will stand as the Order of the Court. January 
11, 2010 
Dated this / th* day of January, 201<n\ 
PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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THE 
IRA B. WARNE 
FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST 
This Agreement is made and entered into this 15th day of July, 1991, by and 
between IRA B. WARNE (hereinafter refened to as the "Undersigned"), of SALT LAKE 
County, State of UTAH, and IRA B. WARNE and AVIS P. WARNE (hereinafter referred 
to as "Trustees"). 
The name of this trust shall be The IRA B. WARNE Family Protection Trust. 
IRA B, WARNE hereby transfers and delivers to the Trustees (or their successor 
Trustees) the property listed m the attached Schedule "A" (which is incorporated herein), 
and the Trustees agree to hold said property and any other property which may be 
transferred to this trust by either inter vivos or testamentary transfer; and all said property 
shall be part of the trust and shall be held, administered and distributed by the Trustees 
according to the terms and conditions stated herein. 
ARTICLE I 
PURPOSES AND BIRTH DATES 
1.1 Purpose of the Trust. This Trust is established for the primary benefit of the 
Undersigned during the Undersigned's lifetime, for the Undersigned's surviving spouse, and 
for the Undersigned's family thereafter. 
1.2 Birthdates. The family of the Undersigned consists of, among others, the 
following: 
Spouse of the Undersigned: 
AVIS P. WARNE, March 29, 1915 
Children of the Undersigned: 
THOMAS W. WARNE, July 15, 1943 
JEFFREY D. WARNE, August 30, 1957 
The dates of birth above referred to may be relied upon by the Trustee for all 
purposes. 
1.3 Community Property. If the Undersigned transfers property to this Trust 
which constitutes community property pursuant to the laws of any community property state 
having jurisdiction over such property, such property shall retain its character as community 
property while held hereunder until the earlier of the death of the Undersigned or the 
Undersigned's spouse. If the Undersigned removes such property from this Trust, such 
property shall continue to retain its character as community property. In addition, as to all 
community property which is transferred to this Trust, this Trust shall: 
a) Remain revocable in whole or in part during the joint lives of the 
Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse, 
b) All said property that is transferred to this Trust shall remain community 
property and any withdrawals therefrom shall be community property of the Undersigned's 
spouse, 
c) During the joint lives of the Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse, 
the Trustees of this Trust shall have powers no more extensive than those possessed by the 
Undersigned or the Undersigned's spouse under the statutory provisions setting forth tnc 
rights and powers with regards to any community personal and real property generally; and 
d) As to community property, this Trust shall be subject to amendment or 
alteration during the joint lives of the Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse upon then 
joint consent. 
ARTICLE II 
DISPOSITION DURING THE LIFE OF THE UNDERSIGNED 
OR INCAPACITY 
2.1 Income and Principal. During the lifetime of the Undersigned, such or all of 
the principal of the Trust Estate and any income which such principal shall generate shall be 
paid or delivered to such persons and in such manner from time to time as the Undersigned 
shall direct in writing or, in the absence of such direction, the Trustees shall pay or apply 
for the benefit of the Undersigned, such amounts to such persons as in the sole and absolute 
discretion of the Trustees is deemed necessary and proper for the health, support, 
maintenance and welfare of the Undersigned, in accordance with the Undersigned's 
accustomed manner of living at the date of this instrument. The Trustees shall exercise in a 
liberal manner the power to invade principal included in this paragraph 2.1, and the rights 
of the remainderman in the Trust shall be considered of secondary importance. 
2.2 Guardianship. During physical or mental incapacitation, the Undersigned 
herein appoints the successor Trustees to succeed his or her place as a successor Trustee, 
guardian, or other legal capacity, whether appointed orally or in writing, and to supervise all 
matters in which the Undersigned had a right to act if the Undersigned had not become 
incapacitated. 
ARTICLE HI 
AMENDMENT, REVOCATION AND ADDITIONS TO TRUST 
3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the Undersigned is alive, the 
Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this Tru&t in whole or in part, 
including the principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from such jmncipal. 
Such revocation or amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in part by written 
instrument. Amendment, modification or revocation of this instrument shall be effective 
only when such change is delivered in writing to the then acting Trustee or Trustees. On 
the revocation of this instrument in its entirety, the Trustees shall deliver to the 
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct m the instrument of revocation, all of the Trust 
property. 
3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries are presently 
vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or 
terminated other than by death. As long as this Trust subsists, the Trust properties and aJl 
th^ rights and privileges hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by the Trustees named 
herein in their fiduciary capacity. 
3.3 Additions to Trust. It is understood that the Undersigned or any other person 
may grant, and the Trustees may receive as part of this Trust, additional real and personal 
property by assignment, transfer, deed, or other conveyance, or by any other means, 
testamentary or inter vivos, for inclusion in the Trust herein created. Any such property so 
received by the Trustees shall become part of the Marital Trust or Family Trust (hereafter 
described) to which said property is appointed and into which it is transferred and shall 
become subject to the terms of this Trust Agreement. If such property is not specifically 
appointed to either die Marital Trust or the Family Trust in particular, it shall be held, 
administered and distributed according to the terms of this entire Trust instrument. 
3.4 After-Acquired Property. It is specifically the intention of the Undersigned 
that all real and personal properties now owned by the Undersigned, except for joint tenancy 
property, may be added to this Trust; provided further that all future real and personal 
properties acquired by the Undersigned may become a part of this Trust at the time acauired 
by the Undersigned. 
ARTICLE IV 
DISPOSITION AFTER DEATH OP THE UNDERSIGNED 
4.1 Basic Trust Division, Trust Names, and Survivorship, At the death of the 
Undersigned, if the spouse of the Undersigned is then surviving, the Trustees shall divide 
the Trust Estate into two separate trusts, hereinafter designated as the "Marital Trust* and 
the "Family Trust", respectively, to be held, administered and distributed according to this 
Article IV as hereinafter stated. At the death of the Undersigned, if the spouse of the 
Undersigned has predeceased the Undersigned, then the trustees shall hold, administer and 
distribute the assets of this trust in accordance with Article V. In case of simultaneous 
death between the Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse, whoever has the smallest 
estate shall be presumed to have survived the other in order to effect the lowest combined 
federal and state estate or inheritance taxes. The preceding sentence and Section 4,3 shall 
be interpreted to achieve the lowest possible combined state and federal estate taxes for the 
Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse. 
4.2 Debts and Taxes. Ail debts, expenses of last illness and funeral expenses, 
attorneys' fees and other costs incurred in administration of the estate of the Undersigned, 
and all federal, foreign estate, transfer, inheritance, and succession taxes payable by reason 
of the death of the Undersigned, may, in the sole discretion of the Trustees, be paid out of 
the Trust assets contributed to the Trust by the Undersigned, The Undersigned absolves his 
or her surviving spouse, if any, from any liability for any of said debts or expenses. The 
Trustees shall have the power to determine whetner or not any or all of the secured debts 
shall be paid (including debts secured by property passing by joint tenancy) and thus 
exonerate particular properties from debt. Hence, the Trustees may pay secured debts, may 
obtain renewals or extensions of secured debts, may distribute property subject to such 
debts, and may do other acts which the Trustees deem appropriate and for the best interest 
of the Trust of the beneficiaries thereof The Trustees shall nave the discretion to require 
that the recipients of any assets included in the federal gross estate of the Undersigned pay 
their proportionate share of any federal, stale or other taxes. The aforementioned is subject 
to two exceptions: (i) none of the said hereinbefore described debts, expenses or federal, 
stale, foreign estate or other taxes shall be borne by the surviving spouse of the 
Undersigned with respect to any such non probate assets or probate assets qualifying for the 
Marital deduction, but shall be charged to the Family Trust; and (ii) the proceeds received 
from any life insurance policies on the Undersigned's life or from qualified pension or profit 
sharing plans, and which may or may not be included in the gross estate of the 
Undersigned, shall not be liable for, or paid toward the debts, expenses, death taxes, or 
other charges against the estate of the Undersigned, if there are other assets available for 
such payment. Further, any proceeds received from insurance policies or retirement plans 
because of the death of the Undersigned and which are not included in the federal taxable 
estate of the Undersigned, shall become assets of the Family Trust and not the Marital 
Trust. The reason for this is to keep those assets from being taxed in the estate of the 
Undersigned. The Trustee is given authority to do whatever is necessary to keep those 
assets out of the federal taxable estate of the Undersigned. 
4.3 Initial Corpus of the Marital Trust. If the Undersigned's spouse shall survive 
the Undersigned, the Trustee shall set aside, transfer and pav over to the Marital Trust all of 
the assets of this Trust. Notwithstanding anything contained in this paragraph, if a reduction 
of the property passing to the Marital Trust under this paragraph would not result in any 
increase in the federal estate tzx upon the Undersigned's estate (after taking into account all 
credits allowable against such tax), said amount shall be reduced Dy the iargesl 
which will result in no increase in federal estate tax upon the Undersigned's estate, and such 
amount shall not pass under this paragraph but instead shall pass and be governed by the 
provisions of Article 4,5 of this Trust. In determining the amount of any such reduction, 
the final determination in the federal estate tax proceeding in the Undersigned's estate shall 
control, and there shall be taken into account all property passing or wliich shall have passed 
to or for the benefit of the Undersigned's spouse under this Trust, the Undersigned's Will or 
otherwise. Such reduction shall be deemed a dollar amount reduction, and the property 
passing as a result thereof under Article 4.5 of this Trust shall not participate in increases or 
decreases during the administration of the Undersigned's estate. To the extent possible, 
assets with respect to which the marital reduction is not allowable for purposes of federal 
estate tax on the Undersigned's estate, or with respect to which a credit for foreign death 
taxes is allowable for such.purposes, shall be allocated to the property passing to the Trust 
created under Article 4.5 of this Trust. 
4.4 Marital Trust Purposes. The Marital Trust shall be held by the Trustees, 
separately in trust, for the fallowing purposes: 
4.401 Income Distribution. The Trustees shall pay to the surviving spouse of 
the Undersigned, commencing as of the date of the Undersigned's death, all of the income 
from the Trust in monthly or other convenient installments, but in no event less frequently 
than in quarter-annual installments. 
4.402 Principal Distribution. Whenever the Trustees determine that the funds 
available to the surviving spouse of the Undersigned from all sources, including the income 
from the Marital Trust, are not sufficient for proper care, maintenance, support and travel, 
including but not limited to the needs arising from illness, accident or misfortune of the 
surviving spouse of the Undersigned, and funds required to permit the purchase of 
residences, the Trustees at any time and from time to time may, in their sole discretion, pay 
or distribute to the surviving spouse of the Undersigned so much of the principal of the 
Trust as they shall deem necessary or advisable under the circumstances, and the rights of 
the remainder an in the Trust shall be considered of secondary importance. 
4.403 Distribution on Death of Survmng Spouse. Upon the death of the 
surviving spouse of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall continue to hold and distribute the 
rest, residue and remainder of this Trust as subject to and under the provisions of Article V; 
provided, however, that the Trustees may, m their discretion, first pay from the Marital 
Trust all debts, expenses and death taxes of the Undersigned's spouse. 
4.404 Disclaimer. The surviving spouse of the Undersigned, or his or her 
executor, after the Undersigned's death, may disclaim in writing the surviving spouse's 
interest in the Marital Trust. If the surviving spouse of the Undersigned disclaims part or 
all of the interest given to the Mantel Trust as referred to in Article IV, the disclaimed 
properties shall pass to and become part of the Fanuly Trust, and shall be distributed as set 
forth therein. 
4.5 The Initial Corpus and Purposes of the Family Trust. The Family Trust shall 
contain the balance of the Trust Estate remaining after setting aside all property of the Trust 
Estate that is included in the Marital Trust. The Family Trust shall not be subject to the 
payment of the debts and death taxes of the Undersigned. The Family Trust shall be held 
by the Trustees separately m trust for the following purposes: 
4.501 Principal and Income Distribution. During the lifetime of the spouse 
of the Undersigned, the Trustees may distribute, commercing as of the date of the 
Undersigned's death, to said spouse and any children or grandchildren of the Undersigned, 
such part or all of the principal and income of the Family Trust as the Trustees, in their sole 
discretion, deem necessary or appropriate for the support and maintenance of the surviving 
spouse and said children and grandchildren in the standard of living to which they are 
accustomed, including reasonable and adequate health, medical, mental, hospital, nursing 
and invalidism expenses. 
4.502 Primary Consideration of Spouse and Minor Children. In exercising 
the discretions imposed upon the Trustees, the Trustees are directed that primary 
consideration be given to the surviving spouse and the surviving minor children, inasmuch 
as they shall likely be the ones with the greatest needs. 
4.503 Exclusive Special Power of Appointment Exercisable Inter Vivos or 
Testarnentaxily; Gift Over in Default, Notwithstanding any of the provisions above, during 
the life or at the death of the surviving spouse of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall hold, 
administer or distribute the assets of the Family Trust to or for the benefit of any one or 
more of (i) the Undersigned's issue; (ii) spouses of the Undersigned's deceased issue; or (Hi) 
siblings or any issue of the siblings of the Undersigned, as the surviving spouse of the • 
Undersigned shall appoint by exercise of this exclusive special power of appointment 
provided herein. Such special power of appointment shall be exercised either inter vivos by 
a written direction delivered to the Trustees of this Trust or by a Will made after the death 
of the Undersigned, which specifically refers to the power herein given, Any appointment 
by the spouse of the Undersigned may be of such estates and interest and upon such terms, 
trusts, conditions, powers and limitations as the surviving spouse shall determine. 
Any appointment may exclude any one or more of the beneficiaries of any 
enumerated class. If, or to the extent that, the spouse of the Undersigned does not exercise 
this testamentary special power of appointment, at the death of the spouse of the 
Undersigned, said assets of the Family Trust shall pass as directed in Article V. However, 
this special power shall not apply to any trust property which the holder of the power at any 
time gifted to the Undersigned which would be included in the estate of the holder for 
federal estate tax purposes if the holder were to leave such a power under IRC 2038. 
ARTICLE V 
DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED 
AND THE UNDERSIGNED'S SPOUSE 
All Trust principal with all accumulated income thereof, directed to be disposed of 
under the provisions of Article V shall, upon iht death of the Undersigned and the 
Undersigned's spouse, be held in trust for the benefit of the then living children of the 
Undersigned, and the then living issue of any deceased children of the Undersigned, and 
shall be disposed of as follows: 
5.1 Support and Education. All remaining Trust assets (principal and income) shall 
be held, administered and distributed as follows: Until the youngest living child of the 
Undersigned is age 32, the Trustees, in their sole discretion, shall distribute such funds from 
income or principal of the Trust Estate, as they deem necessary for the support, maintenance 
and education of the Undersigned's children, and grandchildren (if the Trustees deem the 
grandchildren to be in need); such payments need not be equal in amounts. The Trustees 
shall take into account the needs, ages, assets and other available sources of income and 
support of the Undersigned's children. The Undersigned further particularly directs the 
Trustees that in exercising their discretion hereunder, they should make reasonable 
allowance for the degree of educational expenses at undergraduate college and post-graduate 
college level that have been expended for various of their children and that should thereafter 
be expended for various others of their children, in order to treat their children with some 
degree of fairness with respect to the receipt of educational funds from them. The Trustees 
shall determine the amount to be distributed, the beneficiary to whom distributions are to be 
made, and the time and manner of distributions made under this Section, and shall distribute 
the amounts according to the various needs of the beneficiaries, even if such distribution is 
unequal. Any .such payment is to be charged against the Trust Estate as a whole, rather 
than against the ultimate distributive share of the beneficiary to whom payment is made. If 
amounts are not disbursed under this provision after the youngest Imng child has reached 
age 32; then the remainder shall be distributed according to Section 5.2* 
5.2 Distribution. When each of the surviving children of the Undersigned attain 
the following ages: THOMAS W. WARNE, age 60, and JEFFREY D. WARNE age 32, 
the Trustees shall distribute a share of the remaining principal and income of the Trust 
Estate which has been divided into as many equal shares as there are children of the 
Undersigned then living, and children of the Undersigned then deceased with issue then 
living; provided, further, that each of said equal shares shall either be distributed or held 
and administered, and later distributed by the Trustees as separate trusts, as follows: 
5.201 Living Children. One share shall be set aside in trust for the benefit 
of each of the Undersigned's children who may then be living and held in trust as follows: 
A share of the Trust Estate for each surviving child of the Undersigned, when he or she 
reaches ages specified in section 5,2, shall be distributed to him or her outright upon his or 
her request therefor. Until distributed, the Trustees, In their sole discretion, may pay the 
income and principal of $2x6 share to said surviving child for his or her support, 
maintenance, education and for equipment or other facilities to commence a professional 
practice or otherwise begin his or her life's work, or to purchase a residence as a home and 
not for speculation. Should any said child die before receiving his or her share, it shall pass 
to his or her issue by right of representation consistent with and in accordance with the 
following section, or if not such issue are then living, it shall pass equally to the other Trust 
shares created by Section 5.2. 
5.202 Deceased Children, At such time as a Trust beneficiary (a child of 
Undersigned) dies, or if said child dies prior to the Undersigned, then the trust share shall 
continue to be held in Trust for the benefit of living issue, if any, (grandchildren of 
Undersigned) until the youngest of said children reach the age of 25, Until the youngest 
said children reach the age of 25, the Trustee shall continue to hold the assets of the trust 
estate and may invade the income and principal of the Trust for the support, maintenance, 
medical care and education for the beneficiaries of the Trust as the trustee in the trustee's 
sole and uncontrolled discretion deems best. At such time as the youngest living child of a 
dec^s&i child of Undersigned reaches the age of 25, then that Trust shall terminate and be 
paid out in equal shares by right of representation to the issue of each child of Undersigned 
for whose benefit the Trust is set up. By way of example, upon the death of THOMAS W, 
WARNE, the Trust shall continue to be held for the benefit of his issue, if any. At such 
time as the youngest child of THOMAS W. WARNE reaches the age of 25, the Trust shall 
terminate and the Trustee shall pay the Trust assets out to the issue of THOMAS W, 
WARNE by right of representation. In the event a child of Undersigned dies without having 
issue surviving, then in that event their respective share shall be transferred in equal shares 
to the other Trusts established for the children of Undersigned pursuant to this paragraph, to 
be held, administered and distributed in accordance with said Trust terms. 
5.3 Alternative Distribution. If all oi the above distributions fail, then the Trustee 
shall distribute the property of this Trust equally to those persons who would consdtutc heixs 
at law of the Undersigned, in the proportions provided by the law of descent and distribution 
of the state whose laws govern this Trust. 
ARTICLE VI 
TRUSTEE AND EXECUTOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS 
6 1 In General. The personal representative of the estate of the Undersigned and 
the Trustees of this Trust shall have as complete power and discretion with respect to 
administration and management of the Undersigned's estate and this Trust, as ihc 
Undersigned had over the Undersigned's property while living; such power and discretion 
shall include, by way of illustration and not of limitation, and in addition to any inherent 
implied or statutory power not inconsistent with the other provisions of this Trust, and the 
Undersigned's will, the power hereinafter enumerated in this Article. 'The word "Trustees" 
hereinafter shall refer to the Trustees of this Trust, and the personal representative of the 
Undersigned's estate and "Trust Estate" shall refer to the Trust Estate of the Trust and the 
estate outside of this Trust of the Undersigned. 
6.2 Investments. The Trustees may purchase or otherwise acquire and retain, 
whether originally a part of any Trust Estate hereunder or subsequently acquired, any and 
all stocks, bonds, notes and other such securities or any variety of real or personal property, 
including stocks or interests in investment trusts, mutual funds and common trust funds 
(including common trust funds maintained by the Trustees) as the Trustees may deem 
advisable, whether or not such investments be of a character permissible for investments by 
fiduciaries. Investments need not be diversified and may be made or retained with a view 
toward possible increase in value, notwithstanding the amount or absence of income 
therefrom. 
6.3 Types of Transactions* The Trustees may sell, exchange, lease, pledge, 
mortgage, transfer, convert, or otherwise dispose of or grant options with respect to any and 
ail properties at any time forming as part of the Trust Estate, in such manner, at such time 
or times, for such purposes, for such prices and upon such terms, credits and conditions as 
the Trustees may ocQtn advisable. Any lease or contract made by the Trustees may extend 
beyond the period fixed by statute for leases or contracts made by fiduciaries and may 
extend beyond the duration of any trust hereunder. 
6.4 Borrowing. The Trustees may borrow money from any source, including the 
Trustees, for the benefit of the Trust Estate created hereunder, and as socurity for any such 
Joan, may mortgage or pledge any property in any Trust Estate created hereunder. 
6.5 Management. The Trustees may vote in person or by general or limited 
proxy with respect to any shares of stock or other securities held by the Trustees, may 
become a partv to or deposit securities or other property under or accept securities issued 
under any voting trust agreement (whether or not extending beyond the duration of any mist 
hereunder) and may rescind, terminate or amend any such voting trust agreement, make 
consents, directly or through a committee or agent, to any recapitalization, reorganization, 
consolidation, merger, dissolution or liquidation of any corporation, partnership or 
association in which any Trust created hereunder may have an interest, and may make any 
payments, assignments, or subscriptions and take any other steps which the Trustees may 
deem necessary or proper to enable the Trust created hereunder to obtain the benefits of any 
such transaction. 
6.6 Insurance. The Trustees may effect and keep in force life, fire, rent, title, 
liability or casualty insurance or any other insurance of any nature in any form and in any 
amount, including without limitation, insurance on or with respect to any dwelling and the 
contents thereof in which any beneficiaries reside and any automobile which any beneficiary 
uses, whether or not such dwelling, contents or automobile are part of the Trust Estate. 
6.7 Principal and Income. The Trustees may determine whar is principal or 
income of any trust and apportion and allocate in their discretion its receipts, taxes and other 
expenses and charges between the two. A separate income account ttc&d not be maintained. 
Any income not distributed in accordance with the provisions hereof shall become principal, 
6.8 Alternative Valuation Date and Tax Choices. The Trustees, in selecting the 
valuation date for purposes of federal estate and state death taxes, may select a date which 
results in the lowest tax burden on the Undersigned's estate, considering the effect of the 
federal estate tax and all state death taxes, and also income tax of the property included in 
the Undersigned's estate and the same shall be binding upon all such beneficiaries, without 
further adjustment to any share or portion due a beneficiary. Trustees may also choose 
between taking certain deductions as federal income tax deductions or as federal estate 
deductions, or both. The Trustees shall not restore to principal from income the amount by 
which the federal estate taxes are increased by the estate's loss of any such deductions. 
6.9 Settlement of Claims, The Trustees shall have power to renew, assign, alter, 
extend, compromise, release, with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration, 
obligations or claims held by or asserted against the Trust Estate. 
6.10 Income and Gift Taxes, The Trustees shall have power to join with the 
surviving spouse in federal and state income tax returns for any period prior to the first of 
the Undersigned's death; and also, for federal gift tax purposes, "to consent to the spiiiiing of 
gifts made by the Undersigned to third persons so that such gifts may be treated for the 
purpose of computing gift tax or refunds, including deficiencies, interest and penalties as 
they result from so doing, even though not attributable to the Undersigned** own income or 
property, and even to determine that all sums so payable shall be paid out of the 
Undersigned's Trust Estate, without giving or obtaining any consideration therefor. 
6.11 Trustee Transactions with Other Family Trusts or Estates. The Trustees may 
enter into any transactions authorized by this Article with any other decedent's estate or any 
inter vivos or testamentary trust in which the Undersigned or issue or any of them has 
beneficial interest, even though any fiduciary of such other estate or trust is also a fiduciary 
under this Trust or the Undersigned's will. The Trustees may enter into any transaction 
authorized fry this Article with the Trustees or legal representatives of any other trust or 
estate in which any beneficiary hereunder has a beneficial interest even though such Trustee 
or legal representative is also a Trustee hereunder. Without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, the Trustees may advance funds tof purchase assets from, or sell assets to the 
personal representatives of tht estate of the Undersigned and may pay, with or without 
arrangements for reimbursement, any sums necessary for the settlement of the estate of the 
Undersigned subject to Section 4,3, 
6.12 Reserves for Amortization, Obsolescence, Depreciation and Depletion. The 
Trustees may charge to operating expense all current costs of amortization, obsolescence, 
depreciation and depletion of any properties of the Trust and provide adequate reserves for 
such amortization, obsolescence, depreciation and depletion. 
6.13 Agents. The Trustees may hold investments in the name of a nominee and 
may employ custodians of any Trust property, brokers, agents and attorneys. 
6 .U Distribution in Kind. The Trustees may make any distribution or payments in 
kind, or cause any shares to be composed of cash, property or undivided fractional interests 
in property different in kind from any other share and determine the value of such shares. 
The Trustees may acquire assets for distribution in kind to the beneficiaries hereunder. 
Such assets may include property, real and personal, stocks, bonds, ootes and other 
securities, life insurance contracts and annuiUes, 
6.15 Trustees Expenses. The Trustees may pay from either income or principal of 
the Trust the expenses of administering the same. The Trustees shall have a lien on the 
Trust Estate and may reimburse themselves out of the Trust Estate from either principal or 
income or from both, all advances made for the benefit or protection of the Trust Estate or 
its properties and alJ expenses, loss and liabdities not resulting from the negligence or other 
default of the Trustees incurred in connection with the administration of iht Estate. 
6.16 Payments to Minors or Disabled Beneficiaries. If, in the Trustees discretion, 
any beneficiary (whether under or over age 32) is incapable of making proper disposition of 
any sum of income or principal that is payable or appointed to said beneficiary under the 
terms of this Trust Agreement, the Trustees may apply said sum to or on behalf of the 
beneficiary by one or more of the following methods: (i) by payments on behalf of the 
beneficiary to any one with whom the beneficiary resides; (ii) by payments in discharge of 
the beneficiary's bills or debts, including bills for premiums on insurance policies; or (iii) by 
paying an allowance to the beneficiary directly. TTie foregoing payments shall be made 
without regard to other resources of the beneficiary, and without the intervention of any 
guardian or like fiduciary; provided, however, that the Trustees shall endeavor to apply the 
fiinds for the benefit of the beneficiary, that the funds will not be used by any adult person, 
or any other person for a purpose other than the direct benefit of the beneficiary, and 
particularly so that said funds will not be diverted from the purpose of support and education 
of the beneficiary. 
6.17 Trustees May Rely on Will. In ascertaining whether there has been an 
amendment of this Trust by the Last Will and Testament of the Undersigned or whether 
there has been an exercise of any powers which have been granted to any of the 
beneficiaries herein and which may be exercised by any such beneficiary's Last Will and 
Testament, the Trustees shall be protected in relying upon an instrument admitted to probate 
in any jurisdiction as the Last Will and Testament of the Undersigned or as the Last Will 
and Testament of any beneficiary who has such power. Unless the Trustees have actual 
notice of the admission to probate of such a Will within six (6) months after the death of the 
Undersigned or any such beneficiary, it will be conclusively presumed that no such Will has 
been admitted to probate, and no such Will exists, and that the Undersigned or beneficiary, 
as the case may be, died intestate and the Trust Estate shall be administered accordingly, 
whether or not such Will is thereafter found to exist. 
6.18 Commingling. The Trustees may commingle the funds and assets of any 
Trust Estate hereunder with any other Trust Estate created hereunder zo long as proper 
records are kept of the assets allocable to any such trust. The Trustees shall not be required 
to physically divide any of the investments or any other property unless necessary or deemed 
advisable for the purpose of distribution, but may keep the same or any part hereof in one 
or more funds in which the separate and distinct trust or shares or fraction shall have 
undivided interests. 
6.19 Parties Dealing with the Trustees. No purchaser, and no issuer of any stock, 
bond or other instrument evidencing a deposit of money or property, or other person dealing 
with the Trustees hereunder with respect to any properties hereunder as a purchaser, lessee, 
party to a contract or lease, or in any other capacity whatsoever, shall be under any 
obligation whatsoever to see to the disbursing of monies paid to the Trustees or to the due 
execution of this Trust in any particular, but such person shall be absolutely free in dealing 
with the Trustees on the same basis as though the Trustees were the absolute owners of said 
property, without any conditions, restrictions or qualifications whatsoever. 
6.20 Trustees Liability. No successor Trustee shall be held liable for any mistakes, 
negligence or willful misconduct of any preceding Trustee. Without limiting the generality 
of the foregoing, no Trustee shall be held liable for failing to make detailed examinations of 
the actions or accounts of any preceding Trustee unless such improper actions of the 
preceding Trustee are brought to the attention of the successor Trustee. An honest, 
non-negligent error of judgment shall never be cause of Jiability of any Trustee. The spouse 
of the Undersigned, or issue of the Undersigned while serving as Trustees shall be liable 
only for willful fraud. Other Trustees shall be liable for their acts and omissions in 
accordance with the laws of the State of UTAH. 
6.21 Limitations on Power of Individual Trustees. Notwithstanding specific 
provisions in this instrument to the contrary, any individual serving as a Trustee shall have 
no voice or power in the determination of distributions of principal (including trust 
terminations) or accumulations of income for said individual Trustees, or to or for any 
person to whom said individual Trustee owes a legal obligation of support, nor shall said 
individual fiduciary have any voice or power in any other determination which would cause 
Trust principal to be includible in such individual's estate for tax purposes or which would 
cause Trust income to be taxed to such individual, but such determinations shall be made in 
the sole discretion and at the direction of any Co-Trustee or successor Trustees. Even 
though any successor Trustees are not then serving full time, they shall serve as a Trustee 
for this limited purpose. 
6.22 Miscellaneous Trustee Provisions. In order to carry out the provisions of the 
Trusts created by this instrument, the Trustee shall have ih& following powers, in addition to 
those now or hereafter conferred by law, such powers to be exercised m good faith and in 
accordance with the Trustees' fiduciary obligations: 
(a) To lend money to any person, including the probate estate of the 
Undersigned, provided that any such loan shall be adequately secured and shall bear a 
reasonable rate of interest. 
(b) To purchase property at its fair market value as determined by the 
Trustees in (t\& Trustees* discretion, from the probate estate of the Undersigned, 
(c) To borrow money on such terms and conditions as the Trustees 
consider advisable, and to encumber Trust property by mortgage, deed of trust, pledge or 
otherwise for the debt of the Trust or a Co-owner of Trust property. 
(d) To commence or defend, at the expense of the Trust, such litigation 
with respect to the Trust or any property of the Trust Estate as the Trustees consider 
advisable, and to compromise or otherwise adjust any claims or litigation against or in favor 
of the Trust. 
(e) To withhold from distribution in the Trustees' discretion, at the time 
for distribution of any property in this Trust, without payment of interest, all or any part of 
the property, as long as the Trustees, in their discretion, shall determine that such property 
may be subject to conflicting claims, to tax deficiencies, or to liabilities, contingent or 
otherwise, properly incurred in the administration of the Estate. 
(f) To purchase bonds and to pay such premiums in connection with the 
purchase as the Trustees, in their discretion, consider advisable; provided, however, that 
each premium shall be repaid periodically to principal out of the interest on the bond in such 
reasonable manner as the Trustees shall determine and, to the extent necessary, out of the 
proceeds on the sale or other disposition of the bond. 
(g) To purchase bonds at such discount as the Trustees in their discretion 
consider advisable; provided, however, that the discount shall be accumulated periodically as 
interest in such reasonable manner as the Trustees shall determine, and to the extent 
necessary paid out of the proceeds on Ihe sale or other disposition of the bond or out of 
principal. 
(h) To purchase, in the Trustees discretion, at less than par, obligations of 
the United States of America issued before March 4, 1971, that are redeemable at par in 
payment of any federal estate tax liability of the Undersigned, in such amounts as the 
Trustees deem advisable. The Trustees shall exercise the Trustees discretion and purchase 
such obligations if the Trustees have reason to believe that the Undersigned is in substantial 
danger of death, and may borrow funds and give security for that purpose. The Trustees 
shall resolve any doubt concerning the desirability of making the purchase and its amount in 
favor of making the purchase and in purchasing a larger, even though somewhat excessive, 
amount. The Trustees shall not be liable to the Undersigned, any heir of the Undersigned, 
or any beneficiary of this Trust for losses resulting from purchases made in good faith. The 
Trustees arc directed to redeem any such obligations that are part of Trust corpus to the 
fullest extent possible in payment of the federal estate tax liability of the Undersigned. 
6.23 Income accrued or unpaid on trust property when received into the Trust shall 
be treated as any other income. Income accrued or held undistributed by the Trustees at the 
termination of any Trust created herein, except the Marital Trust, shall go to the next 
beneficiaries of the Trust in proportion to their interest in it. Among successive 
beneficiaries of this Trust, all taxes and other current expenses shall be prorated over the 
period to which they relate on a daily basis. 
6.24 Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, during the lifetime of the 
surviving spouse of the Undersigned, said spouse shall have the power to require the 
Trustees to make alt or part of the principal of the Marital Trust productive or to convert 
promptly any unproductive part into productive property. This power shall be exercised by 
the surviving spouse of the Undersigned in a written instrument delivered to the Trustees. 
6.25 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, it is the Undersigned1* intention to 
have the Marital Trust qualify for the marital deduction under Section 2056 of the Internal 
Revenue Code and the regulations pertaining to that Section or any corresponding or 
substitute provisions applicable to the Trust estate. In no event shall the Trustee take any 
action or have any power that will impair the marital deduction, and all provisions regarding 
the Marital Trust shall be interpreted to conform to this primary objective. 
6.26 For each trust which is otherwise to be established under this Trust instrument 
and to which any of the Undersigned's generation-skipping exemption is allocated, unless the 
trust thereby has a generation-skipping inclusion ratio of zero, the Trustee shall instead 
establish two separate trusts sa that each separate trust has a generation-skipping inclusion 
ratio of either zero (the Exempt Trust) or one (the Nonexempt Trust). This is to be 
accomplished by allocating to the Nonexempt Trust the minimum amount of property 
necessary to establish that trust with an inclusion ratio of one, while leaving the Exempt 
Trust with an inclusion ratio of zero. 
ARTICLE VII 
TRUSTEE PROVISIONS 
7.1 Accounting. With respect to each separate Trust created herein, any corporate 
Trustee shall render at least annually an account of income and principal, including a 
statement of all receipts, disbursements and capital changes, to all beneficiaries then eligible 
to receive income or lo the natural or legal guardians of such beneficiaries. However, 
individual Trustees shall render such annual accounting only if requested by at least one 
beneficiary of the Trust, and as needed for tax returns. So long as the Undersigned serves 
as a Trustee of this Trust, an accounting requested by beneficiaries of this Trust shall be 
limited to a list of issets currently held by the Trustees as part of this Trust, Any time a 
Trustee resigns, is removed or dies in accordance with Sections 7,5 and 7.10, then the 
resigning Trustees, the removed Trustees, or the surviving Co-Trustee or successor Trustee, 
in case of death of a single Trustee, shall submit an accounting to all the living beneficiaries 
of the Trust who shall object in writing to said Trustee's accounting within sixty (60) days 
or said accounting shall be deemed approved by the beneficiaries. 
7.2 Acting in Other Jurisdictions. If for any reason the Trustee is required or 
deans it advisable to take any actions in any jurisdiction in which it is not permitted under 
the laws of such jurisdiction to qualify as a Trustee, the Trustee may appoint to act in such 
other jurisdiction such person or corporation as the Trustee deems advisable. 
7.3 Bond. No bond shall be required of the original Trustees hereunder or of any 
successor Trustees or, if bond is required by law, no surety on such bond shall be required. 
7-4 Compensation. Any individual Trustee shall serve as Trustee without 
compensation; however, a reasonable compensation shall be paid if the individual Trustee so 
requests by a writing attached to this Trust, and when a copy of such request is delivered to 
the then existing income beneficiaries. Any corporate Trustee shall be entitled to a 
reasonable fee for its services commensurate with fees charged by the Trustee for similar 
services. Any corporate Trustee may charge a reasonable fee for transfers to a successor 
Trustee and for any final distribution of any share of the Trust Estate based upon the work 
involved in such transfer or final distribution. 
7.5 Resignation. Any Trustee may resign by giving thirty (30) days written notice 
to all of the then current, adult, competent beneficiaries of any Trust created hereunder. 
7.6 Trustees. The following will act as original Trustees, and as replacement 
Trustees in the following order of succession: 
(a) IRA B. WARNE and AVIS P. WARNE, jointly as original Co-Trustees. 
If either shall fail or cease to serve, then the survivor shall xr/c alone. 
(b) The following will serve jointly as Successor Trustees: 
THOMAS W. WARNE 
JEFFREY D. WARNE 
Tn the discretion of the Trustee, additional Trustees may be added in the 
succession above indicated if more than one trustee is desired. If an institutional trustee is 
appointed Trustee, then no successor Trustee to said institution need be appointed. 
7.7 Dissent Among Trustees. A majority of the Trustees, whether individual or 
corporate, shall have the power to make any decisions, undertake any action, or execute any 
documents affecting the Trust created herein. In the event of a difference of opinion among 
the Trustees, the decision of the majority of them shall prevail, but the dissenting or 
non-assenting Trustee shall not be responsible for any action taken by the majority pursuant 
to such decision. After the death of die Undersigned, if only two (2) individual Trustees are 
in office, they must act unanimously, except when the surviving spouse of the Undersigned 
serves as Co-Trustee, then said spouse's decision shall be binding. If an individual and a 
corporate Trustee are in office, the determination of the individual Trustee shall be binding. 
7.8 Delegation of Authority. Any Trustee may from time to time delegate to one or 
more of the remaining Trustees, any powers, duties or discretions. Every such delegation 
shall be in writing delivered to the delegate or delegates, and shall remain effective for the 
time therein sjjecified or until earlier revocation by a further writing similarly delivered. 
Everyone dealing with the Trustees shall be absolutely protected in relying upon the 
certificate of any Trustee as to who is the acting Trustee or Trustees at the time and as to 
the extent of their authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise. 
7.9 Independence of Court Supervision. In the absence of a breach of trust, no 
Trustee shall ever be required to qualify before, be appointed by, or account to any court or 
obtain the order or approval of any court in the exercise of any power of discretion herein 
given. 
7.10 Removal, While the surviving spo\x$^ of the Undersigned is a Trust 
beneficiary under this Trust, said spouse shall nave the power to require any existing 
Trustee to resign, whereupon a successor Trustee shall be appointed as appointed by said 
spouse, or if the spouse does not appoint a successor then a successor shall be appointed 
pursuant to paragraph 7.6. 
ARTICLE Via 
GEKERAL TRUST PROVISIONS 
8.1 Insurance. 
8.101 Power Of the Undersigned. The Undersigned reserves the.right, without the 
consent or approval of the Trustees, to sell, assign or hypothecate any policies of life or 
accident insurance made payable to the Trustees hereunder, to exercise any option or 
privilege granted by such policies, including but without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, the .right to change the beneficiaries of such policies, and to receive all payments, 
dividends, surrender values, benefits or privileges of any kind which may accrue on account 
of such policies during the Undersigned's lifetime. Furthermore, the Trustees agree to 
deliver to the Undersigned any of such policies deposited with the Trustees hereunder. 
8.102 Duties of Trustees. The Trustees shall hold any policies of life or accident 
insurance which may be deposited with the Trustees, but without any obligation to pay 
premiums, assessments or other charges upon any of the policies or otherwise lo preserve 
them or any of them as binding contracts of insurance. Upon the death of the insured, or 
upon the maturity date of any policy assigned or payable to the Trustees, the Trustees shall 
take such proceedings in their judgment they shall deem necessary to collect aB proceeds 
due on the policies and they may, if they so elect., exercise any settlement options available 
under the policies. The Trustees are authorized to compromise and adjust claims arising out 
of such insurance policies, upon such terms and conditions as the Trustees shall deem 
advisable, and, to the extent necessary, may maintain or defend any dispute; provided, 
however, the Trustees shall be under no duty to maintain or enter into any litigation unless 
their expenses, including attorneys fees and costs, have been advanced or guaranteed in an 
amount and in a manner reasonably satisfactory to the Trustees. The Trustees may repay 
any advances out of the principal or income or this Trust. The receipt of the Trustees to the 
insurer shall be a full discharge of the insurer and the Trustees alone shall thereafter be 
required to see to the application of the proceeds. 
8.2 Spendthrift Clause, The interest of each beneficiary in the Income or 
principal of any Trust created hereunder shall be free from the control or interference of any 
creditor of the beneficiary or any spouse of a married beneficiary and shall not be subject to 
attachment or susceptible of anticipation or alienation. Nothing* contained in this Section 
shall be construed as restricting in any way the exercise of any power or discretion 
granted hereunder. 
8.3 Perpetuity Savings Clause. In any event, and anything lo the contrary herein 
contained notwithstanding, the Trusts created in this Agreement shall terminate upon the day 
of twenty one (21) years after Hie death of the Undersigned and the Undersigned's children 
and grandchildren living at the time this Trust becomes irrevocable, in the event these Trusts 
shall not have previously terminated in accordance with the terms hereof. In the event of 
the termination of these Trusts as provided for in this Section, the Trustees shall distribute 
to the Trust Estate as it shall then be constituted, together with any net income, to the 
beneficiaries then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate, in the same proportion in 
which they are entitled to such income. 
8.4 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be construed as regulated by the laws 
of the State of UTAH. 
8.5 Definitions. The following are various terms used in the Trust Agreement and 
the definitions which the Undersigned intend for such terms: 
(a) Children. "Children" means the lineal descendants in the first degree of 
the Undersigned or of such other persons specifically named or indicated by the text or 
context, "Child" means a single such descendent. The Undersigned intends, for all 
purposes whatsoever, adopted children of the Undersigned or any other person shall have 
exactly the same status as natural bom children, provided, however, adopted children shall 
be treated as natural children only if the adoption occurs before the adopted person's 21st 
birthday. Provided further, however, adopted issue who are also natural issue shall take 
only in one capacity, such capacity being the one which grants to such issue the larger 
share. 
(b) Issue. "Issue" means children and other lineal descendants of the 
Undersigned or of such other persons specifically named or indicated by the text or context. 
(c) Child in Being. A child who is bom alive shall be treated as a child in 
being during the actual period of gestation for purposes of (i) determining if a person (that 
is, the Undersigned or any other person) died without children or issue surviving; and (ii) 
determining if a person is entitled to share in a distribution of Trust principal. All of the 
lights of such a child shall commence at birth. 
(d) "Spousc\ "Surviving Spouse", or "Spouse of the Undersigned", shall 
be deemed to refer to AVIS P. WARNE. 
8.6 Invalid Provisions. If any provision of this Trust is held invalid, none of the 
Other provisions shall thereby be rendered invalid or inoperative, but such provisions shall 
be given full force and effect as herein provided. 
8.7 Survivorship. In determining the beneficiaries of the Trust created herein, a 
beneficiary shall be deemed to have survived the Undersigned, or any other person, a point 
in time, or an event, as the case may be, only if such survivorship is for at least thirty (30) 
days. Provided, however, the preceding sentence shall not apply in any case where its 
application would cause an otherwise valid provision of this Trust to be void because of the 
rule against perpetuity, the mle limiting suspension of the power of alienation, the rule 
against accumulation, or any similar rules. Provided further, however, this procedure with 
respect to survivorship shall not apply as between the Undersigned and the Undersigned's 
spouse. If there is any question as to the order of their deaths, then such shall be 
determined in accordance with Sections 4.1. 
8.8 Age. A person attains a specific age (for example age 21) at the beginning of 
the day that forms the coordinate birthday commemoration (for example, 21st birthday). 
Any person whose birthday falls on February 29 shall be deemed to nave a birthday on 
February 28 for all purposes of this Trust. 
8.9 Number and Gender. The singular shall be interpreted as the plural and 
vice-vem, if such treatment is necessary to interpret this Trust in accordance with the 
manifest intention of the Undersigned, likewise, if either the feminine, masculine ot neuter 
gender should be one of the other genders, it shall be so treated. 
8.10 Paragraph Headings. The paragraph and other headings used herein are 
merely indices for convenience and shall not be used in the interpretation of this instrument 
8.11 Notification of Attorney. If the Undersigned has a serious illness or 
operation, the Undersigned requests that the Trustees contact his attorney, JOSEPH L. 
PLATT, 1313 W. 1800 N , FARMINGTON, UTAH 84025 801-451-7616 lo obtain 
instructions in case the Undersigned should die 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned has executed this Trubt Agreement. 
IRA B. WAI 
0 
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AVIS P. WARNE, Co-Trustee 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
) )ss, 
) 
On the 15th day of July, 1991, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in 
and for said County and State, IRA B. WARNE and AVIS P. WARNE, Jaiown to np4p be 
the persons whose names are subscribed to the foregoing Family. 
acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
SCHEDULE "A" 
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE IRA B. WARNE 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST 
FOR TEN DOLLARS ($10.00), and other good and valuable consideration, the 
Jndersigned, as Grantor, hereby transfers, sells, assigns, and conveys the below-listed 
roperty with all right, title, interest and obligations pertaining thereto, to the Trustees, 
ubject to the terms and conditions of the IRA B. WARNE Family Living Trust, dated the 
5th day of July, 1991. 
PROPERTY 
rYP^gJPTION _ 
ALL PROPERTY - SEE EXHIDIT 1 
GRANTOR'S 
INITIALS . 
nt_-~J ***** the trust on the 15th day of July, 1991. 
1. Any and a&pcnona] property now owned or hereafter acquired by the Undersigned. 
IRA B.^APxNEV Undersigned 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
) 
) 
On this 15th day of July, 1991, personally appeared before me IRA B. WARNE, whose 
name Is subscribed to the foregoing Schedule *A% and acknowledge^ to me that hp^fecuted 
the same. / y 
r 
=T\ 
*TAT£ OP UTAH 
We hereby certify that we have read the foregoing Trust and that it correctly states 
the terms and conditions under which the Tnist estate is to be held, managed, and disposed 
of by the Trustees. We approve the dedaration of Trust in all particulars and request the 
Trustees to execute i t 
We further state that any properties transferred to this Trust which constitute 
community property pursuant to the laws of any community property state having 
jurisdiction over such property, then such property shall retain its character as community 
property while held in said Trust until the earlier of the date of the death of the person who 
created this Trust, or said person's spouse. In addition, if any property is removed from 
this Trust such property shall continue to maintain its character as either community or 
separate property appending upon what kind of property it is. 
L £• IRA B. WARNE 
AVIS P. WARNE 
STATE OF UTAH 




On the 15th day of My, 1991, personalty appeared before, 
AVIS P. WARNE, known to me to be the pe#6r>d who executi * 
lijr'f 1 <%\l 
STAT; UF U W 
EXHIBIT 1 TO SCHEDULE A 
FAMILY PROTECTION FINANCIAL SUMMARY SHEET 
As of the 15th day of July, 1991 
IRA B. WARNE FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST 
This is a summary page of individual asset schedules 
on file with my attorney, Joseph L. Piatt 
PROPERTY 
ASSETS VALUE 
BANK ACCOUNTS $44,000.00 
SECURITIES (STOCKS, BONDS, ETC.) $94,880.00 
PENSION & PROFIT SHARING PLANS, IRAs, $30,000.00 
PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD ARTICLES $78,000.00 
TOTAL ASSETS: $24^,880.00 
TOTAL DEBT: $35,000.00 
r ASSETS: $211,880.00 
TabH 
Partial Revocation of 
and Amendment to 
The Ira B. Warne 
Family Protection Trust 
WHEREAS, the undersigned, Ira B. Warne as Grantor, and Ira B. Warne and Avis P. 
Warne as Trustees, executed The Ira B. Warne Family Protection Trust ('Trust Agreement") on 
15 July 1991; and 
WHEREAS, Avis P, Warne is deceased, and pursuant to paragraph 7.6 of Article VII, 
'Trustee Provisions" (which states that if one of the Trustees ceases to serve, the other shall 
serve alone), Ira B. Warne is authorized to act as the sole Trustee of the Ira B. Warne Family 
Protection Trust; and 
WHEREAS, under Article III, titled "Amendment, Revocation and Additions to Trust," 
paragraph 3.1, titled "Rights of the Undersigned," Grantor reserves the right to amend, modify, 
or revoke the Trust Agreement in whole or in part; and 
WHEREAS, Grantor specifically wishes to preempt the results of the case Banks v. 
Means, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,2002 UT 65 (2002); and 
WHEREAS, Grantor interprets the phrase <4until this Trust is revoked" found in 
paragraph 32 to mean "revocation... of this Trust,.. in whole or in part" (paragraph 3.1), 
rather than "revocation of this instrument in its entirety" (paragraph 3.1), noting that the latter 
phrase is used to define the specific and narrow circumstance and time as to when the Trustees 
are to deliver all trust property to the Undersigned, thus indicating that the word "revoked" 
found in paragraph 3.2 in feet means "revoked in whole or in part"; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Grantor hereby revokes the Trust Agreement, in part, as 
follows, thereby terminating the presently vested interest of the beneficiaries under paragraph 
3.2; and further amends the Trust Agreement as set forth herein: 
A. Provisions to be Revoked. The Grantor hereby revokes paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of 
Article I titled, "Purposes and Birth Dates," which begin with the words "Purpose of the Trust" 
Ira B. Wanie 
Pip! of7 
and which end with the words " . . . the Trustee for all purposes." The remaining paragraph of 
said Article I shall remain intact. 
The Grantor further revokes paragraph 3.2 of Article III titled, "Amendment, Revocation 
and Additions to Trust" which begins with the words "Interests of the Beneficiaries" and which 
ends with the words "in their fiduciary capacity." The remaining paragraphs of said Article III 
shall remain intact. 
The Grantor further revokes and deletes in its entirety Article V titled, "Disposition on 
the Death of the Undersigned and the Undersigned's Spouse" 
Finally, the Grantor revokes paragraph 7.6 of Article VII, titled, 'Trustee Provisions" 
which begins with the words "Trustees. The following will act . . ," and which ends with the 
words "need be appointed." The remaining paragraphs of said Article VII shall remain intact. 
B. Provisions to be Inserted. The Grantor inserts the following paragraphs in the 
appropriate place in the Trust Agreement and declares said provisions to express his desires and 
intent (provisions to be inserted are shaded): 
ARTICLE I 
PURPOSES AND BIRTH DATES 
1.1 Purpose of the Trust This Trust is established to dispose of the 
Undersigned's assets as set forth herein;particularly in the distribution provisions found 
in Article V titled, "Disposition on the Death of the Undersigned and the Undersigned's 
Spouse." 
12 Primary Beneficiaries., Following the Grantor's death, the Trustees shall 
distribute, pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, Trust Assets to the Primary 
Beneficiaries> who include those, ahcl only those, listed by came'or referred to as follows: 
Name Blrthdate Relationship or Interest 
Jeffrey D. Wanie 30 August 1957 Son 
The Undersigned has in mind but makes no provision herein for Thomas W. 
Warne, or his issue, or any other individual not specifically referred to in the Agreement 
by name or class, whether an heir or not. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this 
Agreement, said individuals shall not be deemed "Beneficiaries" as those terms are 
r.B.uf. 
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defined in the Trust Agreement or in this Amendment, and shall not be entitled to receipt 
of any Trust assets. This pretermission is intentional and binding. 
The Grantor inserts the following paragraphs in the appropriate place in the Trust Agreement and 
declares said provisions to express his desires and intent (provisions to be inserted are shaded): 
ARTICLE i n 
AMENDMENT, REVOCATION AND ADDITIONS TO TRUST 
3,2 Interests of the Beneficiaries Limited. The Undersigned intends that 
Trust assets be protected in the following manner. Any interest of any Beneficiary in any 
assets of the Trust or in income or principal related to any asset of the Trust is under the 
sole and absolute control of the Trustees until the Trustees actually distribute said interest 
to the Beneficiary. That is, a Beneficiary's rights in any asset of the trust or*in income 
or principal related to any asset of the Trust do not vest until actual distribution or 
alienation of said interest by the Trustees to said Beneficiary pursuant to the distribution 
provisions of the Trust. Because the assets do not vest in the Beneficiary prior to 
distribution, said assets are free, until distribution, from the control and interferenceof 
any creditor of any Beneficiary, the parent of any Beneficiary,1 the issue of any 
Beneficiary, the betrothed of any Beneficiary, the spouse of any married Beneficiary, or 
the divorced spouse of any Beneficiary, and a Beneficiary shallhave no power to pledge, 
assign, mortgage, sell, or hr any manner transfer or hypothecate any interest that said 
Beneficiary may have or may expect to have in any assets bfQie trust or in income or 
principal related to any asset of the Trust Nor shall any Benfeficiary have any power in 
any manner to anticipate, alienate, charge, or encumber his or her interest, whetherin an 
asset, income, or principal of the Trust except as rnaiy be otherwise expressly provided in 
this Agreement Nor shall any interest of any Beneficiary be liable or subject in any 
maimer while in the possession of the Trustees for the? debts, contracts, liabilities, 
Engagements, obligations, or torts of said Beneficiary. 
The Grantor inserts the following Article V in the appropriate place in the Trust Agreement and 
declares said provisions to express his desires and intent (provisions to be inserted are shaded): 
ARTICLE V 
DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED 
AND THE UNDERSIGNED'S SPOUSE 
Ail Trust principal, with all accumulated income thereof, directed to be disposed 
of under the provisions of this Article V shall, upon the death of the Undersigned and the 
Undersigned's spouse, be disposed oif as follows: * 
IiaB. Warne 
AmcndniCBt 
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5.1 Asset Apportionment And Distribution. The Trustees will set aside all 
the Trust assets into a trust called the "Jeffrey D. Wame Beneficiary Trust/1 The 
Trustee? will then distribute those assets outright and immediately to Jeff. 
5.2 If Tbe Primary Beneficiary Cannot Receive His Beneficiary Trust. If 
Jeffrey D. Warne cannot receive all or part of his Beneficiary Trust for any reason, then 
the Tru5tees will divide that Primary Beneficiary's share as follows: 
5.201 If The Primary Beneficiary Cannot Claim And Has Issue. If 
Jeffrey D. Warne cannot claim for any reason, and he has children or 
grandchildren (that is, issue), then you will divide all JefFs share among his issue 
by right of representation. 
The Trustees will set aside the issue's sihares into separate trusts called 
"Issue Trusts." The Trustees will distribute Issue Trust assets to a particular issue 
in sufficient amounts to pay for said issue's tuition, books, and room and board to 
a post-secondary educational institution. The Trustees will distribute any 
remaining funds (or all the funds if said issue does not attend a post-secondary 
educational institution) to said issue when he or she reaches the age of 25. 
5.202 If The Primary Beneficiary Cannot Claim And Has No Issue. 
If Jeffrey D. Wame cannot claim all his share for any reason, and heias no issue, 
who can claim, then all that Beneficiary's share will be apportioned to the 
Morganville United Methodist Church in Morganville, New Jersey and 
distributed outright and immediately. 
The Grantor inserts the following paragraph in the appropriate place in the Trust Agreement and 
declares said provisions to express his desires and intent (provisions to be inserted are shaded): 
ARTICLE VI 
TRUSTEE PROVISIONS 
6*6 Trustees. The following will act as Original Trustee: 
(a) Ira B. Warne 
Upon tlie death of the Undersigned, the following will act as Successor Trustee: 
(b) Jeffrey D. Warne 
A&*gS 
Ira B. Warne 
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C. Confirmation of Trust Agreement. Except as otherwise specifically noted in this 
Amendment, Ira B. Warne ratifies and confinns all the provisions of The Ira B. Wame Family 
Protection Trust, dated July 15, 1991, 
THIS AMENDMENT TO THE TRUST AGREEMENT consists of 7 pages (including 
those pages containing the "Attestation and Statement of Witnesses") and shall govern the 
administration of The Ira B. Wame Family Protection Trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor and Trustee have executed this Amendment to 
The Ira B. Warne Family Protection Trust on this _jL day of ./*//? ^ 2003. 
cJL^ & &£ j^Lr^fi^ 
JLiaJL/. r r a t u w v i i u i u u x <UJU» XILUJVWC 
uidimnf J / / Amen me t 
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ATTESTATION AND STATEMENT OF WITNESSES 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s 
County of Salt Lake ) 
We, 
individually 
•Tr^ t>» A KVYil^U and U ^ c ^ W ^ i ^ H i . being 
and severally, do ftercby deposcTind state under oafic 
duly sworn 
1. Ira B. Warnc (the "Grantor") declared to us that the attached document-titled "Amendment To The Ira B. 
Wame Family Protection Trust" (the "Arnendment")-is his Amendment; that he is familiar with its contents; and that 
it reflects his desires. The Grantor further requested that we witness his sign said Amendment. 
2. In the Grantor's presence and sight and in the presence and sight of each other, we witnessed the Grantor 
sign the Amendment at the end thereof and wither witnessed the Grantor initial or sign the Amendment on each 
page preceding the Grantor's signature at the end thereof. 
3. At the time of signing the Amendment, the Grantor was older man eighteen years of age. 
4. Based on our conversations with the Grantor and the Grantor's answers to certain questions, we are of 
the opinion that the Grantor could converse in and read the English language; suffered no physical impairment 
preventing the creation and execution of a valid Amendment; was of sound mind, memory, and understanding; was 
free from the influence of alcohol or drugs; was under no duress, fraud, constraint, or undue influence from or by 
any person to sign the Amendment; and signed it voluntarily and willingly* 
5. We are not related to the Grantor by blood, marriage, or adoption, and to the best of our knowledge, we 
are not entitled to any part of the Grantor's estate upon the Grantor's death under any testamentary document now 
existing or which may exist by operation of law. 
6. The person whom we witnessed sign the Amendment as Grantor is known to us personally or proved to 
us on the basis of convincing evidence to be Ira B. Warnc. 
7. This "Attestation and Statement of Witnesses'* is attached to the Amendment, which consists of 7 pages, 
including this Attestation and Statement. 
DATCD this ^ L &Y °flIJfiUfl003, 
,1 7/nM$>./_fflf* ^i&n.at JAM k)0iforja&rl 








JWy_Cofm Expires Aug. 9,2004 ft 




Witness S t a t u r e 
Print Na 
p residing at 
Street Address 
T^son, AZ- ^7Q^/ 
City, State, Zip Code 
(S2Q) qiYblltj 
Telephone Number 
, On t h i f f ^ d a y o f r f o y ^003, before me, a Notary Public, personally appeared Tf iVl f l nfijf [//><-
(yjCiU \AJ(Df4rfJL .personally known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to ^p and. 
the personsJwhose names are subscribed as Witnesses to this "Attestation and Statement of Witnesses." i '1 
e me *'s ( fUia-
/CATHY: 'BYROAD
 k .. NOWV^UBUC-ARIZONA 0 
PJMA COUNTY 
My Comm. Empires Aug. 9. 
Tab I 
Codicil To 
The Last Will and Testament of 
Ira B. Warne 
I, Ira B- Warne, residing at 2863 East Saint Mary's Way, Salt Lake City, Utah and being 
>f sound and disposing mind and memory and free from all menace, fraud, duress, or undue 
nfluence, on t&is J ^ . day of f*f /fY~2Q03, do hereby make, publish, and declare this to be a 
:odicil to my Last Will and Testament, dated 15 July 1991 (the "Will"), in the manner and form 
following: 
1. Fiduciaries. I w i sh t 0 delete paragraph 3.1 of Article III of my will, which begins 
with the words "Designation of Personal Representative" and ends with the words *\ . . Jeffrey 
0. Warne." I wish to insert the following provisions in place of the deleted paragraph 
[provisions to be inserted are shaded): 
ARTICLE III 
DESIGNATION OF FIDUCIARIES 
3.1 Designation Of Personal Representative. I nominate the following as 
personal representative of my estate. 
Jeffrey D> Warae 
2. Remaining Provisions. All other terms, conditions, distributions, and provisions of 
my Will are hereby republished, and shall remain in force and effect. 
THIS CODICIL TO MY WILL consists of 3 pages (including those pages containing the 
"Attestation atfd Statement of Witnesses") and shall govern the administration of my Will, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this Codicil to my Will on this JL day of 
, ^ ^ ^ 2 0 0 3 . 
Ira B. WWne, Testator 
CodtaJ 
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ATTESTATION AND STATEMENT OF WITNESSES 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 




 frjL'x.r* l?Y)t) I'/tj J and LucyL \jJttbz\jLsr , being duly sworn 
and severally, do hereby depose-anil state under oath; 
1. Ira B. Warne (the "Testator'*) declared to us that the attached document titled "Codicil To The Last Will 
of Ira B. Warne" (the "Codicil") was his Codicil and requested that we witness his sign said Codicil. 
2. In the Testator's presence and sight and in the presence and sight of each other, we witnessed the 
Testator sign the Codicil at the end thereof and further witnessed the Testator initial or sign the Codicil on each page 
preceding the Testator's signature at the end thereof 
3. At the time of signing the Codicil, the Testator was older than eighteen years of age and, in our 
respective opinions, could converse in and read the English language; suffered no physical impairment preventing 
the creation and execution of a valid Codicil; was of sound mind, memory, and understanding; was free from the 
influence of aicohol or drugs; was under no duress, fraud, constraint or undue influence from or by any person; and 
signed the Codicil voluntarily and willingly. 
4. We are not related to the Testator by blood, marriage, or adoption, and to the best of our knowledge, we 
are not entitled to any part of the Testator's estate upon the Testator's dearii under any testamentary document now 
existing or which may exist by operation of law. 
5. The person whom we witnessed sign the Codicil as Testator is known to us personally or proved to us on 
the basis of convincing evidence to be Ira B. Warne. 
6. This "Attestation and Statement of Witnesses" is attached to tike Codicil, which consists of 3 pages, 
including this Attestation and Statement 
DATED this _ X day o f ^ f l 2 0 0 3 . 
I J ^ M A ^ ^ •**« frVfr*/ l) Orach tr\ 
Witness Signature A Street Address 
PnntNarae






„residing at U M ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ c j q £?C^ 
Street Address 
"Tlucs^o, AZ ? S 7 o 4 
City, State, Zip Code 
Telephone Number 
, On this j day of J ^ U a 2003, before me, a Notary Public, personally appeared I f\f\o 
and [^ifY^hjTy'rJrtjrX-- U . personally known to me or proved to me on the basts of satisfactory Q 
evidence tl/bethe persons whose names are subscribed as Witnesses to this "Attestation and Statement of 
Witnesses M 
SBVEPJU.LY SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to ^ efo« me 
OATV ffVnOAD 
_ rf;l *0 ArYP'^ UC-AHIZONA 
g.W riM/u:cH^TY 
f4v <"or>ni C^rc* Aug 9, 2004 





LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
IRA B. WARNE 
I, IRA B. WARNE, of SALT LAKE CITY, SALT LAKE County, State of UTAH, 
declare this to be my Last Will and Testament and revoke all earlier Wills and Codicils. In 
this Will I expressly do not exercise any power of appointment which now or hereafter may 
be conferred upon me by anyone, either by will or in any other manner. Otherwise, I 
intend by this Will to dispose of all property which I now own or over which I have the 
power of disposition. 
ARTICLE I 
1. Marital Status and Heirs. I am married to AVIS P. WARNE and all references 
to my spouse are to AVIS P. WARNE only. The children of the Undersigned consists of 
the following: 
THOMAS W. WARNE, July 15, 1943 
JEFFREY D. WARNE, August 30, 1957 
All references to my children are to such children and to any child subsequently born 
to or legally adopted by me. 
I do not intend to make bequests or devises in this Will to my spouse, to my 
children, or to the issue of any deceased child of mine, except as such bequests or devises 
may be specifically provided for in this Will. 
ARTICLE n 
DISPOSITION OF ESTATE 
2.1(a) Tangible Personal Property - Gift by Written Statement. I give my tangible 
personal property not otherwise specifically devised in this Will, except any such property 
which, at the time of my death, is used in a trade or business, in accordance with a written 
statement signed by me or in my handwriting which I intend to leave at my death. 
2.1(b) Contingent Gift. I give all of my tangible personal property not effectively 
disposed of by such written statement, or otherwise specifically devised in this Will, except 
any such property which, at the time of my death, is used in a trade or business, to my 
spouse if my spouse survives me. If my spouse fails to survive me, I give such property to 
my issue who survive me, by representation, to be divided among them as they shall agree, 
or if they shall fail to agree within six (6) months after the appointment of my personal 
representative, to be divided among them in portions of approximately equal value (adjusted 
by the principle of representation, if applicable), as determined by my personal 
representative. If any such issue is under the age of 18 at the time of such division, the 
person having custody of such issue shaii represent him/her for ail purposes of this 
paragraph, and the receipt of such person shall discharge my personal representative from all 
responsibility for the proper application of the property so receipted for. 
2.2 Pour-Over to Family Protection Trust. On the 15th day of July, 1991, I 
executed a written Trust Agreement entitled the IRA B. WARNE Family Protection Trust 
with IRA B. WARNE and AVIS P. WARNE as Trustees. I hereby confirm such Trust. 
That Trust and this Will form part of an integrated plan to provide for the disposition of my 
estate upon my death and both instruments should be construed and administered 
accordingly. I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of my property, not effectively disposed 
of by the above described written statement or by other provisions of this Will, whether 
real, personal, or mixed, and wherever situate to the Trustee of such Trust, in trust, to be 
administered and distributed pursuant to the provisions of such Trust including any 
amendments made subsequent to the execution of this Will that sire in effect at the time of 
my death. It is my intention not to create a separate trust by this Will nor to subject the 
above described Trust or the property added to it by this Will to the jurisdiction of any 
probate or similar court. I make no additional provisions herein for my spouse or children 
because they are provided for in said Trust. In the event said Trust is revoked by me prior 
to my death or in the event the same is otherwise not effective, or the residue of my estate 
is not conveyed to it by this Will, I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue 
and remainder of my estate both real, personal and mixed and wherever situate to the 
Trustees named above or to the successor Trustees, in trust, in accordance with the terms of 
said Trust executed on the 15th day of July, 1991, without giving effect to any amendments 
made subsequently, whicli Trust is incorporated herein by reference. 
ARTICLE III 
DESIGNATION OF FIDUCIARIES 
3.1 Designation of Personal Representative. I nominate the following as personal 
representative(s) of my estate, to act jointly, 
THOMAS W. WARNE 
JEFFREY D. WARNE 
3.2 Designation of Guardian. I nominate and appoint the following as guardian(s) of 
the person of each child of mine who is a minor or under other legal disability, to act in the 
sequence named, each to serve in the event the preceding person or persons, as applicable, 
fails to qualify or after qualifying fails to act: 
N/A 
3.3 Designation of Conservator. I nominate the following as conservator(s) of the 
estate of each child of mine who is a minor or under legal disability, to act jointly. 
THOMAS W, WARNE 
JEFFREY D, WARNE 
3.4 Bonds Waived, I direct that each fiduciary, including successors, shall be 
permitted to qualify without the necessity of giving a bond or other undertaking in this or 
any other jurisdiction for the faithful performance of such fiduciary's duties, or if any bond 
shall be required by law, statute or rule of court, without the necessity of sureties thereon. 
3.5 Fiduciary Powers. My fiduciaries may exercise all the powers in the UTAH 
Uniform Probate Code, including provisions granted by amendment after the date of my 
Will and after my death. 
3.6 Incorporation by Reference. For purposes of the administration of my estate in 
any jurisdiction other than UTAH, the UTAH Uniform Trustee's Provisions as they exist on 
the date of the execution of this Will, and any additional powers subsequently granted by 
law or statute in UTAH up to the date of my death, are incorporated herein by reference 
and shall be effective as fully as if they were set out at length in this Will, and my 
fiduciaries shall have, in addition to the powers expressly granted in this Will, all of the 
powers conferred or provided for by said Provisions to the extent that such powers are 
consistent with the powers expressly granted in this Will. 
ARTICLE IV 
EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATION 
4.1 Pursuant to the provisions of the written trust agreement described in paragraph 
2.2 herein, the Trustee has discretion to use certain properties of the trust estate for the 
purpose of paying my debts and expenses of last illness, burial and administration of my 
estate and all taxes arising at or because of my death, together with interest and penalties 
thereon, if any. My Personal Representative shall cooperate with the Trustee in determining 
the source from which such debts, expenses and death taxes are to be paid, using assets of 
my estate, properties of the trust estate, or both to the extent appropriate. All estate, 
inheritance and other taxes payable by reason of my death, including taxes with respect to 
property not passing under this Will, shall be paid as expenses of administration and such 
expenses and other expenses of administration shall be paid from the residue of my estate or 
said Trust without contribution from any person and without apportionment except as 
apportioned in said Trust. 
ARTICLE V 
MISCELLANEOUS 
5.1 Governing Law. This Will has been drawn and executed in the State of UTAH. 
All questions concerning the meaning and intention of any of its* terms, its validity, or the 
exercise of any power of appointment created herein shall be determined in accordance with 
the laws of the State of UTAH. 
5.2 Definitions. Definitions of terms in my Will shall be as defined in the UTAH 
Uniform Probate Code in effect at my death. 
5.3 Intentional Omission of Heirs. I have in mind all persons who are natural 
objects of my bounty. Except as expressly provided in this instrument, I have intentionally 
omitted to provide herein for any person claiming to be an heir of mine. 
5.4 Transactions with Trustees. My Personal Representative, in its discretion, may 
purchase assets from any trust created by me and may sell any assets in my estate to the 
Trustee of any trust created by me at their fair market value as determined by the Personal 
Representative and the Trustee. To the extent permitted by law, such sales or loans may be 
made without court order or confirmation and I expressly exonerate my Personal 
Representative and the Trustee from any and all liability connected herewith. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, IRA B. WARNE, the testator, sign my name to this 
instrument this 15th day of July, 1991, and being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the 
undersigned authority that 1 sign and execute this instrument as my Last Will and that I sign 
it willingly, that I execute it as my free and voluntary act for the purposes therein 
expressed, and that I am eighteen years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no 
constraint or undue influence. 
WARNE, Testator 
We, ROBIN R, BOYD and BETTY D. BLANK, the witnesses, sign our names to 
this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby declare to the undersigned authority 
that the testator signs and executes this instrument in our presence as his last Will and he 
signs it willingly, and that he executes it as his free and voluntary act for the purposes 
therein expressed, and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the testator and of 
each other, hereby signs this Will as witness to the testator's signing, and that to the best of 
our knowledge the testator is eighteen years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no 
constraint or undue influence. 
ty BLANK, Witness 
1141 North Redwood Road, #88 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
5554 South 235 East 
Murtay, Utah 84107 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
) ss. 
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by IRA B. WARNE, the testator, 
and subscribed and sworn to before me by ROBIN R. BOYD and BETTY D. BLANK, 
witnesses, this 15th day of July, 1991. 
'*- ••••;. U7 64111 




IRA B. WARNE 
Paragraph 2.1 of my Will, executed on July 15, 1991 distributes items of my tangible 
personal property (not money, evidences of indebtedness, documents of title, stock 
certificates or business property) in accordance with this writing; I hereby make this 
memorandum for that purpose and to comply with the provisions of Utah Code Ann 75-2-
513 (1953, as amended). 











Dated this day of , 19 
